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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Financial Economics  
 
Li Sun  
 
This dissertation analyzes households’ asset allocation decisions and studies how the financial 
crisis affects income distribution using panel datasets from household surveys. The first essay 
focuses on how the precautionary saving motive can affect households’ asset allocation decisions. 
It develops a life-cycle model that explicitly accounts for the effects of potential future expenditure 
shocks; the implications of this model better match the empirically observed investment behaviors 
of households. A precautionary index is constructed to measure the adequacy of households’ 
precautionary saving, and it is found that this factor has significant explanatory power regarding 
households’ stock market participation and risky asset allocation decisions. In the second essay, a 
life-cycle model is developed to investigate how health risk and rare event risk will affect retirees’ 
optimal asset allocation decisions. Health Risk is modeled as a stochastic medical expenditure, 
calibrated using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. The rare event risk is modeled as a 
financial crisis risk where the stock market has a small but positive probability of crashing. 
Compared with models that do not take into account health risk or financial market risk, the 
optimal policy rules and the simulation results obtained from this model better explain retirees’ 
equity holding behaviors as observed in the empirical data. In the third essay, a non-parametric 
decomposition methodology is applied to analyze the change of income distribution before and 
after the 2008 financial crisis in the United States. I decompose the Lorenz curve and its associated 
concentration curve by subgroups defined on the basis of  race, gender, and retirement status using 
the 2007-2009 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) panel dataset. It is found that the income 
distribution shifted following the crisis. For households in the bottom to the 9th decile of the 
income distribution, income share increased, and the increases were more pronounced when 
measured by the concentration curve. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 In the past several decades, the life cycle model, which applies stochastic optimal control 
methodology, has been used to study households’ inter-temporal saving and consumption 
decisions. It also helps us understand how households allocate their wealth into risky and riskless 
assets, i.e., the asset allocation problem. In the seminal work developed by Merton (1971, 1973), 
it is found that, in the absence of the labor income or if labor income is perfectly tradable,  investors’ 
optimal allocation of wealth to risky assets should depend only on investors’ risk preference and 
the mean and volatility of stock market returns. Subsequent research has extended the model to 
account for a more realistic characterization of households’ budget constraints, where labor income 
is added to the model, and background risk is emphasized as an important factor which can affect 
households’ investment decisions (Cocco et al., 2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Wachter and 
Yogo, 2010).  
 Another strand of literature focuses on the precautionary saving motives of households.  
Carroll (1992, 1994, and 1997) finds that current consumption is strongly related to future income 
uncertainty, which is contrary to the permanent income hypothesis that households’ current 
consumption will depend on lifetime income. Analysis of the Survey of Consumer Finance 
indicates that precautionary saving is a strong motive for households to accumulate wealth and 
therefore can reduce current consumption. Precautionary saving can be seen as households’ hedge 
against uncertainty in labor income and other types of background risks, such as unexpected health 
expenditure. While most previous literature has focused on uncertainty in labor income, few 
studies have analyzed how emergency expenditure shock can affect households’ saving and 
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portfolio choices. Future emergency expenditure shocks can be seen as a form of contingent 
consumption which can affect households’ future consumption level if not properly hedged. 
Emergency expenditure can be seen as similar to spending on necessity goods, consumption of 
which households have little flexibility to reduce once they occur, such as unexpected medical 
expense. Compared to other types of consumption, spending related to medical expense is less 
discretionary and can crowd out households’ other consumption.  
 In the first essay of the dissertation, I develop a simple life cycle model to account for the 
impact of the future emergency expenditure shock and analyze how households’ saving and 
investment behavior will be affected by this expenditure shock. Instead of focusing on households’ 
inter-temporal budget constraints, I argue that future expenditure shock can be modeled as a form 
of contingent consumption that can affect households’ utility function. Households will not know 
when emergency expenditure shock will occur, but they can have prior knowledge of the 
distribution of the size of these shocks; therefore, they can estimate the expected value of this 
amount. Due to the uncertainty in its timing, households need to hedge this expenditure shock 
every period; thus, households’ utility function will depend on both their current consumption and 
the expected value of this expenditure shock.  
 In spirit, this model shares features with the “habit formation” models, in which the agent’ 
utility function depends on the difference between consumption and a “habit” (Constantinides, 
1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2007). However, the crucial difference 
between my model and the habit formation model lies in the characterization of “habit.” In much 
of the habit formation literature, habit is a representation of past aggregate consumption, while in 
  
4 
 
my model, habit is defined as the value of expected emergency expenditure, which can reduce the 
effective consumption level of households once it occurs.  
 The policy function derived from the model implies that the optimal risky asset share starts 
very low when normalized wealth is low and increases as normalized wealth increases. Compared 
to models that do not account for the expenditure shock (Cocco, 2005), this model can better 
explain the empirical observation that households with higher normalized wealth have a higher 
share invested in risky assets.  
 As precautionary saving can be a major reason for households to accumulate wealth so 
they can have enough resources to meet future emergency expenditure shock, the sufficiency of 
this saving can affect households’ investment risk taking. Using a reported variable of desired level 
of emergency funds and the actual households’ asset data from the Survey of Consumer Finance, 
I construct a precautionary index to measure the adequacy of households’ precautionary saving. 
The index is defined as the ratio of households’ total available resources to the desirable amount 
of funds, and a higher value of this index indicates that the household will have greater ability to 
meet its emergency needs and therefore can increase the household’s risk tolerance.  
 Using regression analysis, I further analyze how the index affects households’ stock market 
participation and portfolio choice decisions. The regression results show that the precautionary 
index has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of households’ decisions 
to participate in the stock market. The share invested in risky assets is also higher when the 
precautionary index is higher. Specifically, a one percent increase in the precautionary index will 
increase the predicted probability of holding equity by 0.0377 percentage points and will increase 
the risky asset share by 0.023 percentage points. In addition, the precautionary index’s impact on 
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the risky asset share is larger for investments held in households’ retirement accounts than for 
directly held stocks.  
 In further research, it will be useful to see how other major future expenditure, such as that 
for housing purchase and medical expenses, can be incorporated into households’ inter-temporal 
optimization models. Together with the emergency expenditure discussed in this essay, they can 
be seen as special types of contingent consumption households need to consider when they make 
saving and asset allocation decisions. Modeling these future spending needs as contingent 
consumption that would reduce the effective level of current consumption provides insights into 
households’ asset allocation decisions.  
 In the second essay of this dissertation, I use the life-cycle model to analyze retirees’ saving 
and asset allocation decisions. Previous literature has often modeled the labor income of retirees 
as a certain percentage of their last working year’s wages, which is a fixed amount and will not be 
subjected to permanent income shock (Cocco, 2005). This implies that retirees’ income is less 
risky and that they should have a higher percentage of their wealth invested in risky assets. 
However, empirical evidence has shown that the risky asset share actually decreases after 
retirement, which cannot be explained by the previous characterization of the labor income process 
in the retirement phase. On the other hand, a large body of literature has documented that health 
risk can play an important role in determining investors’ risk taking behaviors (Yogo, 2009; De 
Nardi et al., 2010; Hugonnier et al., 2012; Scholz and Seshadri, 2013). The health risk factor can 
be particularly relevant for retirees because health risk increases as people age.  
 I develop a life cycle model where the health risk is modeled as stochastic expenditure 
which can effectively reduce retirees’ income. I calibrate the health expenditure ratio using data 
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from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), which provides the most comprehensive panel data 
on U.S. retirees’ health condition, out-of-pocket health expenditure, income, and asset holding. In 
addition, I take into account the possibility of a financial crisis, the effect of which may be different 
between retirees and non-retirees, whose investment horizon is longer and who can have more 
time to recoup from the large loss caused by the financial crisis. This is an extension of the notion 
in the rare event or the tail risk literature, which tries to address the risk premium in asset pricing 
by considering the occurrence of rare events that could happen in the financial market and whose 
detrimental effect on wealth can raise the risk premium of stocks (Liu, 2005; Todorov, 2011; 
Gabaix, 2012; Wachter, 2013).  
 By incorporating these two important factors in the life cycle model, I derive the retirees’ 
optimal consumption and portfolio choice functions. The optimal policy rules imply that for all 
age groups (except in the year before death), the portfolio share in stocks gradually increases as 
normalized wealth approaches 4.5 and slowly declines until leveling out when normalized wealth 
is higher than 15. This model can explain the investment decisions when normalized wealth is in 
the range of 1 to 6, where that of 75% of retirees falls.  Based on the optimal policy functions and 
initial wealth distribution, calibrated from the HRS, I conduct a simulation analysis for 5000 
retirees and calculate the mean, 5th, and 95th percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of the 
risk asset share, and the results are very close to the actual holding level found in the HRS. In 
addition, I extend the model by incorporating heterogeneous health risk and find that the model 
implies that households with a higher mean health expenditure ratio would hold fewer risky assets, 
which is consistent with findings in the empirical literature (Rosen 2004, Edwards; 2008).  
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 In the third essay of this dissertation, I characterize the income distribution of the U.S. 
population using the Lorenz curve, which calculates the income share for households in each decile. 
Compared to a single index measurement, such as the Gini coefficient, the Lorenz curve offers a 
more complete description of income inequality. I then apply a decomposition methodology 
proposed in Bishop et al. (2004) to study the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the change in 
income distribution of U.S. households. By analyzing the Lorenz curve and its associated 
concentration curve with panel data, this decomposition methodology can track the conditional 
change in income inequality before and after the financial crisis. Furthermore, this methodology 
allows us to decompose the Lorenz and the concentration ordinates by population subgroups, based 
on demographic characteristics, and examine how different groups contribute to the ordinates 
before and after the crisis.  
 The analysis results indicate that in the short run, overall income distribution shifted as a 
result of the financial crisis. The income share of households in the top decile declines, and it 
increases for households in the bottom nine deciles. This change is reflected in the cross year 
Lorenz ordinates but is more evident in the concentration ordinates, where households in each 
decile do not change. Households in the top 10% of the income distribution earned 47% of the 
total earnings in 2007, and received only 37.7% of total income in 2009, if we preserve the ranking 
of each household. In addition, the decomposed concentration ordinates for subgroups, 
characterized by race, gender, and retirement status, followed a pattern similar to that found for 
the overall sample. 
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Chapter 2 
Precautionary Saving and Asset Allocation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 Life cycle models have been widely used in studying households’ consumption and 
portfolio choice decisions. With power utility preference, most life cycle models imply that at low 
normalized wealth levels, households should invest all their wealth in risky assets. This implication 
fails to explain the phenomena of low stock market participation and the low share of the portfolio 
invested in risky assets (Cocco et al., 2005). Even after accounting for housing consumption 
(Cocco, 2005; Yao, 2005), the life cycle model’s prediction for optimal risky asset holdings is still 
too high compared to the empirical data. This paper presents a simple model that incorporates 
households’ unexpected future expenditure, or contingent consumption, into the power utility. The 
optimal portfolio rule derived from this model explains the low portfolio share of risky asset 
holdings when normalized wealth is low. It also explains why the investment share in risky assets 
increases along with normalized wealth when wealth level is relatively low. 
 This model is closely related to the habit model, according to which the household’s utility 
depends not only on current consumption but also on a “habit” level of consumption. The habit 
model generates a more realistic optimal portfolio rule than the non-habit model (Polkovnichenko, 
2007). However, in the habit formation model, the “habit” is usually related to past consumption 
levels or a minimum sustainable level of consumption. In my model, the “habit” is not internally 
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formed, nor is it related to the past consumption level; rather, it represents the level of unexpected 
future expenditure that can be seen as a form of contingent consumption that a household has to 
spend when it occurs. With the anticipation of this type of emergency expenditure, households will 
hold fewer risky assets and engage more in precautionary saving behavior. After solving the model 
that explicitly accounts for this emergency expenditure, I further study how precautionary saving 
and the household’s ability to meet its emergency needs can affect its investment risk-taking 
behavior.  
 Previous studies on consumer behaviors have found that the precautionary saving motive 
plays an important role in households’ wealth accumulation. Uncertainty about future income and 
expenditure causes households to engage in buffer-stock saving behavior by reducing their current 
consumption. Precautionary saving can be seen as a hedge against households’ background risks, 
which include but are not limited to labor income risk, unexpected health expenditure risk, 
longevity risk, and business risk. Studies on portfolio choices have documented that households 
with higher uninsured background risks will reduce their financial risk taking. Since precautionary 
saving can be used to insure against households’ background risks, households are more likely to 
hold risky assets if their precautionary savings are sufficient to cover background risks. By contrast, 
if households’ precautionary savings are not sufficient to protect them from uninsured background 
risks, they will hold more safe assets and reduce risk-taking behaviors. Therefore, the adequacy of 
precautionary saving is an important determinant of household financial risk-taking behavior. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature by quantitatively measuring the adequacy of households’ 
precautionary saving and examining its impact on risky asset investment decisions.  
 Using a variable of reported desired level of emergency funds and the actual households’ 
asset holding data from the Survey of Consumer Finance, I compute a precautionary index that 
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captures the adequacy of households’ precautionary saving and examine its effect on the 
households’ stock market participation and asset allocation decisions. As documented in previous 
studies (Calvet and Sodini, 2014; Wachter and Yogo, 2010; Haliassos and Jappelli, 2003; 
Berkowitz and Qiu, 2006), wealthy households are more likely to participate in the stock market 
and to hold more risky assets than non-wealthy households. The elasticity of the share of risky 
assets with respect to financial wealth is large and significant. However, other studies (Cocco et 
al. 2005) find that non-participation exists even among wealthy households. Higher wealth alone 
cannot fully account for households’ ability to manage background risks. The amounts desired in 
emergency funds reflect how much households need in case of an emergency, which can be 
interpreted as the amount of funds required for reducing background risk. The ratio of a 
household’s actual assets to the amount of emergency funds desired, which combines information 
relating to both budgets and needs, can be a more effective measurement of households’ ability to 
manage background risk and can better predict their risk-taking behaviors.  
 Households with higher background risks desire a higher amount of precautionary savings 
than households with lower background risks. For two households with similar levels of assets, 
the household which desires a higher amount of precautionary savings has a lower precautionary 
index. Its assets might not be sufficient to cover its emergency needs as compared to those of the 
household which desires a lower level of precautionary saving. A higher precautionary index value 
indicates that the households’ available assets are high compared to their emergency needs, which 
can increase their abilities to manage background risk and can affect their risk-taking behavior.  
 To test this empirically, I use a logit model to estimate the precautionary index’s impact on 
households’ stock market participation decisions, and I use a linear probability model to estimate 
the risky asset share equation. The analysis yields the following findings. First, the effects of the 
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precautionary index on the probability of participating in the stock market and on the share of risky 
assets held among the financial assets are both positive and statistically significant. A one percent 
increase in the precautionary index, which can be due to a decrease in the desired amount of 
emergency funds, will increase the predicted probability of holding equity by 0.0377 percentage 
points and will increase the risky asset share by 0.023 percentage points. These results are 
consistent with the previous results found in the limited participation and background risk literature 
(Haliassos and Jappelli, 2003; Calvet and Sodini, 2014; Guiso et al., 1996; Palia et al., 2014).  
Second, many households hold equity both in their retirement accounts, such as 401(k), 
IRA, and Keogh Accounts, and outside these accounts, and I find the effect of the precautionary 
index on risky asset share in these two types of accounts is different in magnitude. Retirement 
accounts typically have a longer investment horizon and stricter withdrawal policies, so 
households are less likely to withdraw funds from these accounts when emergency funds are 
needed. The precautionary index’s impact on risky asset share should be smaller for directly held 
stocks. The estimation results confirm this prediction. The last major finding of this paper is that 
the impact of the precautionary index is greater on the risky asset share for households who are 
retired or risk-averse and less for households which have actively managed businesses.  
 This Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the relevant literature. Section 
2.3 provides empirical evidence for the relationship between households’ investment behaviors 
and their wealth level. Section 2.4 presents a life cycle model that explicitly accounts for the 
emergency consumption by households. Section 2.5 develops hypothesis tests and provides 
estimation results regarding the precautionary index. Section 2.6 discusses the effects of the 
precautionary index in different subsamples. Section 2.7 concludes this Chapter.  
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2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Precautionary saving behavior 
 The life cycle/permanent income hypothesis, first proposed by Friedman (1957) and 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), suggests that a household’s current consumption should be 
affected not by current income but by expected lifetime income. The model implies that 
households save primarily for retirement in order to smooth consumption when their income after 
retirement drops. However, research on consumption behavior shows that the predictions from the 
permanent income hypothesis are not consistent with observed consumption behavior. Carroll 
(1992, 1994, and 1997) find current consumption is unrelated to predictable changes in income, 
but is strongly related to future unemployment expectation, and more generally, to future income 
uncertainty. Households reduce consumption and hold more assets to protect themselves from 
unpredictable future fluctuations in income. Deaton (1991) also shows that in the presence of 
borrowing constraints, the precautionary demand for saving provides a motive for a household to 
hold assets.  
 Subsequent empirical research has tried to quantify household risk and measure its impact 
on households’ precautionary wealth accumulation. Carroll and Samwick (1998) find that about 
40 percent of wealth accumulated can be attributed to a precautionary saving motive induced by 
income uncertainty. Lusardi (1998) finds that saving and wealth accumulation are associated with 
variance of income. Guariglia (2001) finds that labor income risk has a statistically significant 
effect on households’ saving decisions. Cagetti (2003) finds that wealth accumulation is driven 
mostly by precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle, whereas savings for retirement 
purposes become significant only closer to retirement.  
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 Though empirical evidence shows some support for precautionary wealth accumulation, 
the analysis has its drawbacks. As pointed out by Hurst et al. (2005), households with high income 
uncertainty, such as business owners, will hold a large amount of wealth for non- precautionary 
reasons. Simply regressing wealth on risky labor income will lead to an overestimation of the 
importance of the precautionary motive in the wealth accumulation process. The availability of a 
direct measure of precautionary wealth in household surveys provides a better estimation of the 
precautionary motive in wealth accumulation; however, the results are mixed. Jappelli (2008) uses 
a precautionary wealth variable from Italian household survey data to test the precautionary 
saving/buffer stock model and finds no support for buffer stock behavior. For U.S. households, 
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) use the desirable amount of emergency funds reported in the Survey 
of Consumer Finance as a proxy for precautionary saving and find that precautionary wealth exists 
but that it is not as large as previously estimated. They find that precautionary wealth accounts for 
only 8% of the total wealth holdings. They also find that precautionary saving is more important 
to older households and business owners.  
2.2.2 Background risk and portfolio choice 
 In a perfect market environment, if income or background risk is perfectly insurable, 
investment behavior should not be affected by background risks. However, imperfection in the 
financial market and uninsured background risk induce risk-averse households to reduce their risky 
asset holdings when background risk exists. One of the biggest motives behind precautionary 
saving is to insure against unexpected income risk, which is an important background risk 
households face. Previous research has examined how labor income risk can affect portfolio choice. 
With Italian household data, Guiso et al. (1996) find uninsured labor income risk, as measured by 
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the subjective expected labor income variance over the next 12 months, has a small but statistically 
significant negative effect on the share of risky assets held by households. Hochguertel (2003) 
finds subjective income uncertainty has an effect on risky asset holding; however, the effect is 
economically small and not as important as the level of financial asset holdings, age, education, 
and tax incentive. 
 In additional to the labor income risk, background risks can include health and longevity 
risk as well as unexpected change in housing expenditure or business risk, and studies find that the 
presence of these background risks can also affect households’ asset allocation decisions. 
Fratantoni (1998) finds households with higher housing expenditure relative to labor income hold 
a lower share of risky assets among their financial wealth. Heaton (2000) finds that risky human 
capital is an important determinant of stock market participation and asset allocation decisions at 
different stages of an investor’s life. Palia et al. (2014) find households’ background risks, as 
measured by volatilities of labor income and its correlation with stock returns, housing risk, and 
business income, are statistically significant and economically important for households’ stock 
market participation decisions and stock holdings. 
2.2.3 Limited participation in the stock market  
 Merton (1971) and Samuelson (1969) indicate that the optimal holding of risky assets 
should depend only on an individual's risk aversion, risk premium, and stock volatility in a perfect 
market. However, it is a well-documented fact that a large number of households do not hold stocks 
at all. Many studies have attempted to explain these non-participation phenomena. The major 
thesis of the limited participation literature is that households face higher costs of participating in 
the stock market. Haliassos (1995) show that liquidity, information cost, and risk embedded human 
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capital are the major determinants of the decision not to participate. Zhan (2015) finds credit 
constraints, occupation-linked income risk, and entrepreneurial risks, but not housing, are major 
factors reducing stock market participation in the Euro area.  
 Information cost can also affect the decision to participate in the stock market. Households 
with lower education and cognitive skills have higher costs in obtaining information necessary for 
stock market investment. Rooij et al. (2011) find that those with low financial literacy are much 
less likely to invest in stocks. Christelis et al. (2010) find that the propensity to invest in stocks is 
strongly correlated with cognitive abilities. Brown et al. (2008) find that social interaction matters 
in stock market participation decisions. In particular, the community stock participation rate has a 
causal effect on an individual household’s decision to own stocks.  
 Studies also show personality traits and one’s psychological profile can affect one’s 
propensity to own stock. Guiso and Zingales (2008) find that lack of trust is an important factor in 
explaining limited stock market participation. Less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stocks 
as they feel a greater risk of being cheated. Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) find that higher loss 
aversion lowers stock market participation, along with the share of risky assets owned. Gyllenram 
and Hanes (2014) find that individuals who can better cope with stressful situations are more likely 
to own stocks. This effect is even more pronounced among the wealthiest households. 
2.3 Evidence on Households’ Investment Behaviors  
 The traditional life cycle models imply that the portfolio share in risky assets should 
decrease when normalized wealth level rises (Cocco et.al.,2005); households with lower 
normalized wealth levels should invest more in stocks. However, empirical data show that stock 
holding rises with wealth. In this section, I present findings that show both stock participation and 
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portfolio shares invested in risky assets are significantly lower when normalized wealth is below 
certain cutoff points. All household data are obtained from the Survey of Consumer Finance.  
2.3.1 General overview of the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)  
 The SCF is triennial cross-sectional survey data published by the Federal Reserve. The 
survey provides detailed information on household finance, including households’ asset holdings, 
credit and debts, income, and wealth, as well as a set of characteristic and preference questions. 
The SCF contains two important subsamples. The first sample uses a random statistical area 
probability model to choose households across the country, and it represents the characteristics of 
the general population in the United States when weighted. The second subsample focuses on the 
wealthy households; in this subsample, the SCF uses households’ IRS filing information to select 
households in the top decile of the wealth distribution. The dual-frame sample design provides a 
comprehensive picture of U.S. households’ balance sheets, as well as those of households in the 
top wealth distribution, whose financial situation may be different from that of the general public.  
Since the SCF collects sensitive financial data which some households are reluctant to 
provide and information is consequently missing for some questions, the Federal Reserve 
developed a set of imputation techniques to correct for the missing data by imputing the missing 
values five times. Following Calati et al. (2008) and Lee and Carlin (2010), I use the average of 
all five imputations as an observation value. The survey unit in the SCF is the household, and all 
financial data are collected on a household basis. The survey respondent is determined to be the 
person “most knowledgeable about family finances” and is usually the head of the household.  
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[Insert Table 2-1 here] 
 Table 2-1 presents a summary of the statistics for key variables in the SCF. All variables 
are weighted using the weight provided by the Federal Reserve. Liquid assets include assets in 
checking accounts, saving accounts, and money market funds. Financial assets include all liquid 
assets, CDs, stocks, assets in retirement accounts, saving bonds, cash values of whole life insurance 
policies, and other managed accounts (trusts, annuities, and managed investment accounts in which 
HH has an equity interest). Equity includes directly held stocks, stock mutual funds, and stocks in 
combination mutual funds. Distributions of the financial variables are skewed to the right; mean 
values of income, equity, assets, and net worth are substantially higher than the median values. 
Table 2-1 also provides summary statistics for a subjective measure of households’ risk-taking 
attitudes regarding investment.  
2.3.2 Normalized wealth and investment behavior  
 As shown in Wachter and Yogo (2010), the portfolio share of risky assets rises as net worth 
increases for middle-age households. They use the log of wealth as a measure of the wealth effect, 
which is not directly related to the normalized wealth concept typically used in the life-cycle model. 
In this section, I provide further evidence showing that a lower level of normalized wealth not only 
reduces a household’s risky asset share but also decreases the probability of a household’s 
participation in the stock market. I calculate the normalized wealth level by dividing the 
household’s total financial wealth by the household’s income. Ideally, I should use the household’s 
permanent income as the denominator to calculate the normalized wealth, yet permanent income 
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is not an observable variable, so I use the household’s actual income1 as a proxy. I create two 
dummy variables to indicate that the household’s normalized wealth is below 1 and 2, respectively. 
[Insert Table 2-3 to Table 2-6 here] 
 As shown in the second and third column of Table 2-3, the coefficients on the normalized 
wealth dummy variables are significantly negative. After controlling for other demographic, 
income, and wealth variables, a household’s probability of holding any stock will be reduced by 
17.23 percentage points and 9.53 percentage points if the household’s normalized wealth is below 
1 and 2, respectively. Table 2-5 shows the effect of normalized wealth on portfolio share. A 
household’s portfolio share in risky assets will be reduced by 14.17 percentage points if the 
household’s normalized wealth is below 1 and will be reduced by 9.01 percentage points if the 
normalized wealth is below 2.  
 Table 2-6 shows the normalized wealth regression results for subsamples of different 
normalized wealth levels. Model I restricts the sample to households whose normalized wealth is 
under 2 and for whom the coefficient on the normalized wealth variable is large and highly 
significant, indicating that when normalized wealth is low, risky asset share increases as 
normalized wealth rises. Model II restricts the sample to households whose normalized wealth is 
above 5 and for whom the coefficient on the normalized wealth variable is no longer significant. 
When normalized wealth is sufficiently high, the risky asset share does not rise when normalized 
wealth increases.  
                                                 
1 The SCF asks if the household income is normal or typical of that year. A normal income is a better proxy for the 
permanent income.  
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2.3.3 The saving motive and investment behavior  
 The traditional life-cycle model indicates that households save to smooth consumption over 
time, and they save during their working life and dis-save during their retirement stage, which 
implies that households should save primarily for retirement. However, as Carroll (1994, 1996, 
and 1997) and subsequent precautionary saving literature have found, households also engage in 
precautionary saving behavior. Different saving motives can influence households’ investment 
behavior; this section provides evidence showing that households with different saving motives 
can have different investment behaviors.  
[Insert Table 2-7 here] 
 The SCF surveys households’ primary saving motives; Table 2-7 provides a description of 
households’ major saving motives and the distribution of these motives. In the SCF sample, 35.5% 
of the households report the primary reason for their saving is retirement, and 31.5% of the 
households save primarily for an emergency; i.e., they are precautionary savers.  
[Insert Table 2-8 to Table 2-10 here] 
 The regression results show that households which save primarily for retirement have a 
7.67% higher probability of participating in the stock market, and the part of their portfolio 
invested in risky assets is 6.13 percent higher than that of other households. On the other hand, 
precautionary savers, whose primary goal is saving for emergency needs, have a lower probability 
of participating in the stock market, and the part of their portfolio invested in risky assets is 2.78 
percentage points lower than that of other households. These results suggest that the impact of 
precautionary saving on risky asset investment can be fundamentally different from that of long 
term saving behavior (i.e., saving for retirement), households perceive emergency needs as 
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contingent expenditures that need to be made once they occur, and the existence of these 
emergency needs can change a household’s investment behavior.  
 In the next section, I present a life cycle model that explicitly accounts for households’ 
emergency needs and derive its implications for optimal portfolio choice. This model can better 
explain the empirical pattern observed in the data: stock market participation and risky asset share 
both rise with normalized wealth when the normalized wealth level is low.  
 
2.4 A Life Cycle Model Including Contingent Consumption  
2.4.1 Preferences  
 I model emergency needs as expenditure shock that can occur in each period and 
households’ utility function depends both on current consumption and on this contingent 
expenditure shock.  The model is similar to the habit model, where a household’s utility depends 
on the difference between current consumption and a “habit,” which can be seen as a general level 
of aggregate consumption or a subsistence level of consumption. In my model, households take 
their emergency needs into consideration, and they see emergency needs as a contingent 
expenditure, which can reduce consumption significantly if it occurs. This variable measures how 
much households need to spend if an emergency situation emerges; however, it does not affect a 
household’s intertemporal budget constraints because households do not pay insurance premiums 
to reduce emergency risk in this model. The amount of the emergency fund is exogenous in this 
model, much like in the habit model, in which “habit formation is external.” Emergency spending 
can also be seen as a type of expenditure shock which effectively reduces a household’s 
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consumption once it occurs. Taking this shock into consideration, household i’s preference is 
characterized by a power utility function:                  
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(2-1) 
where the household is assumed to a live maximum 𝑇 period. In each period, there is a possibility 
that the household will die. Let  𝑝𝑡 denote the probability that the household is alive at date𝑡 + 1, 
conditional on it being alive at date t. The household maximizes expected life utility with a constant 
relative risk aversion 𝛾 and time preference parameter 𝛽 . Values for these parameters will be 
discussed in Section 2.4.5.  
2.4.2 The labor income process  
 Following previous literature (Carroll, 1997; Winter et al., 2012; Cocco et al., 2005), the 
labor income process can be modeled as comprising a deterministic component and two stochastic 
components, which can be specified as:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (2-2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of labor income, 𝑓(𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) is a deterministic function, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of 
variables capturing information regarding individual characteristics, including demographics, 
education, and the number of years working. 𝑢𝑡  captures the permanent income shock, which is 
modeled as an AR(1) process, and the variance of the permanent income shock is  𝜎𝑢
2;  𝑒𝑖𝑡is the 
transitory shock, which is i.i.d and is distributed as  𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2). 
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2.4.3 The financial market 
 In each period, investors can invest in two assets in the financial market: a riskless and a 
risky asset. The riskless asset has a return 𝑟𝑓 for each period, and the risky asset is characterized 
by a mean risk premium of 𝜇 and an innovation component 𝜂𝑡+1:  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜇 + 𝜂𝑡+1 (2-3) 
where  𝜂𝑡+1 is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2).  
2.4.4 Households’ optimization problem  
 After the household has made the consumption decision and the asset allocation decision, 
its financial wealth at the beginning of next period, t+1, will be:  
 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑝 (𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡) (2-4) 
The return of the portfolio from time 𝑡 to time 𝑡 + 1 is given by:  
 ?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑝 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡)𝑟𝑓 (2-5) 
where 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is the portfolio share invested in the risky assets and 1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is the portfolio share 
invested in the risk-free assets. Assuming that the household faces borrowing constraints and 
cannot short sell the risk-free asset, 𝛼 is restrained to be in the interval [0, 1]. The household’s 
optimization problem is to maximize the objective function (2-1) subject to the constraints (2-2) 
through (2-5).The state variables are{𝑡, 𝑋𝑡, 𝑌}, and the control (choice) variables are {𝐶𝑡, 𝛼𝑡}. For 
each period, the optimal rules of consumption and portfolio share are functions of the state 
variables t, Xt, and Y. The Bellman equation for a household’s optimization problem is given by:   
  
24 
 
 𝑉𝑖𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = max
𝐶𝑖𝑡≥0,0≤𝛼𝑖𝑡≤1 
[𝑈(𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1],     𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 (2-6) 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑡) is the value function, denoting the maximized utility. Given 𝑋𝑖𝑡, the next period 
total resource is:  
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 (2-7) 
Substituting (2-4) and (2-5)  into (2-7) , 𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 can be expressed as:  
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 = (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡)(𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡)𝑟𝑓) + 𝑌𝑖 (2-8) 
2.4.5  Parameters and model calibration  
 Table 2-11 presents the parameter values of the model. Households retire at age 65 and 
have a maximum lifespan of 100 years. As shown in Cocco (2005), the deterministic part of the 
labor income process can be fitted to a third-degree polynomial, and the coefficients are estimated 
for different educational levels. I use their estimation coefficients for high school graduates as a 
benchmark case here. During their working life, the deterministic part of their labor income 𝑓(𝑡) 
is additively separable in 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑖𝑡, and can be specified as:  
 𝑓(𝑡) = −2.1700 + 0.1682 − 0.00323 × 𝐴𝑔𝑒2 + 0.00002 × 𝐴𝑔𝑒3 (2-9) 
After retirement, the deterministic part of the labor income is replaced by a constant value, which 
is the household’s last working year’s income multiplied by a replacement ratio: 0.682. Figure 2-
1 presents the graph of the age profile of the deterministic part of the labor income for both high 
school graduates and college graduates.  
[Insert Figure 2-1 here] 
The variance of the permanent and temporal labor income shock are also obtained from Cocco 
(2005). The mean value of the contingent consumption (emergency funds) to the permanent 
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income ratio is estimated from the Survey of Consumer Finance. The mean value for the whole 
sample is 0.48. Financial market parameters follow the standard benchmark values used in the 
literature.  
2.4.6 The model solution: optimal portfolio policy  
 Using the parameter value discussed in Section 2.4.5, I solve the model numerically to 
obtain the optimal portfolio policy. This section presents these optimal rules under two different 
scenarios.  
2.4.6.1 Policy rules without considering emergency spending 
 As discussed in the previous section, if we do not consider the effect of contingent 
consumption (i.e., 𝐸 = 0), the household’s utility function will be 𝑈𝑡
𝑖 =
𝐶𝑖𝑡
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
. The optimal share 
invested in risky assets should be very high when the normalized wealth is low, as the present 
value of the riskless human capital is large compared to the wealth; therefore, the household should 
invest more in risky assets. This is the result implied by the life cycle model in Cocco et al. (2005).  
Figure 2-2 presents this case: 
[Insert Figure 2-2 here] 
 Figure 2-2 shows that households should invest all their cash-at-hand in the risky assets 
when the normalized cash-at-hand is below 5, and this holds across all age groups. As normalized 
wealth increases, the optimal share invested in risky assets decreases. When the normalized wealth 
is high, the present value of the future human capital is smaller relative to the normalized wealth, 
and households should tilt their investment towards more riskless assets and reduce their risk 
exposure. This optimal portfolio policy, however, cannot explain some important empirical facts 
about households’ behavior. In the SCF, the mean normalized wealth is 1.78, and the mean risky 
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asset share is 0.25. The median normalized wealth is only 0.55, and the median risky asset share 
is 0.10.  75% of households have a normalized wealth ratio below 2. The benchmark life cycle 
model fails to explain households’ optimal behavior when normalized wealth is low, which is the 
case for most American households. In the next section, I present the optimal portfolio rule when 
the effect of contingent expenditure is considered.  
2.4.6.2 Policy rules considering emergency spending   
 As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the presence of emergency spending can change a 
household’s risk taking behavior. In this case, household utility depends on consumption as well 
as contingent consumption.  Household utility is given by: 𝑈 =
(𝐶−𝐸)𝑖𝑡
1− 𝛾
 
1−𝛾
. 
[Insert Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 here] 
Figure 2-3 presents the optimal portfolio rule when contingent consumption has been accounted 
for. This result is qualitatively similar to the one obtained from the “habit” model (Polkovnichenko, 
2007). The optimal policy rules differ substantially from those in the benchmark case. The optimal 
risky asset share starts very low when normalized wealth is low and increases as normalized wealth 
increases. Since most households have a normalized wealth ratio below 2, it is useful to further 
examine the optimal portfolio share when normalized wealth level is low. Figure 2-4 shows a more 
detailed portrait for households at different ages when normalized wealth is below 5. This model 
better captures the dynamics of stock investment, especially when normalized financial wealth is 
below 1.8, where that of half of the American households falls. The model implies that the mean 
optimal portfolio share is about 0.1, closer to the actual mean portfolio share of 0.17 found in the 
SCF, when normalized wealth is below 1. In the next section, I construct a precautionary index 
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that measures households’ ability to meet expenditure shock and quantify the effect of this index 
on households’ risk-taking behaviors.  
2.5 The Precautionary Index: Hypothesis Testing and Estimation 
2.5.1 Construction of the precautionary saving index 
 From 1995 onwards, the SCF has asked a question about how much households will need 
in precautionary savings for emergencies. The question is stated as follows:  
"About how much do you think you and your family need to have in savings for unanticipated 
emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?"  
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) provides a comprehensive review for this variable. They argue that 
this variable captures the amount of precautionary wealth households wish to have.  
[Insert Table 2-12 here] 
 Table 2-12 provides summary statistics of the desirable precautionary wealth for the whole 
sample and for subsamples. The mean value of the precautionary wealth is $25,511, and the median 
value is $5,762.  Panel A shows the precautionary wealth by different net worth levels. Households 
with higher net worth demand a higher level of precautionary wealth in case of emergency as 
expenditure can be proportional to the household’s wealth level. The median desirable 
precautionary wealth for households with above median wealth is $11,330, three times higher than 
that for households whose wealth is below the median. Panel B shows that retired households have 
a higher need for precautionary wealth than non-retired households. The median value for retired 
households is $10,000, whereas the median value for non-retired households is $5,665. 
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To measure households’ ability to meet their emergency needs, I construct an index 
incorporating information from both the desirable level of emergency funds and households’ 
available assets. Following Kennichell (2004), I calculate the household’s available liquidity as a 
weighted sum of its total assets minus six months’ debt payments. The weight of each class of 
assets is assigned to reflect the liquidity nature of the assets. Liquid assets, which include cash, 
checking accounts, saving accounts, and money market mutual funds, have a weight of 1; stock in 
non-retirement accounts has a weight of 0.8. Assets in retirement accounts have a weight of 0.3, 
and non-financial assets have a weight of 0.5. In practice, households can also borrow against their 
home equity or engage in other types of loans to manage their liquidity. However, I do not 
explicitly include these considerations in the available resources calculation. 2 
  I compute the precautionary index by dividing the total available resources by the desirable 
amount of emergency funds. This index measures the extent to which households are able to cover 
the need for emergency funds using their available assets. A higher precautionary index indicates 
that a household’s assets are abundant relative to the amount needed in an emergency situation, 
which can make the household more risk tolerant. A ratio equal to one indicates that a household 
needs to use all its liquidity resources to cover the expected emergency spending. A ratio above 
one indicates that the household’s own assets are inadequate to cover the emergency needs. The 
inability to meet its precautionary needs can reduce a household’s risk-taking capacity.  
                                                 
2 The value of the housing asset partially reflects the amount of home equity loan that households can borrow when 
facing emergency situations.  
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2.5.2 Market participation hypothesis and regression results  
 In this section, I estimate how the precautionary index can affect households’ stock market 
participation decisions using a logit model. The hypothesis is that a low precautionary index would 
reduce a household’s probability of holding risky assets. As discussed in the previous section, 
holding other things constant, a low precautionary index indicates that a household’s available 
assets are low compared to the desirable level of emergency funds. In this case, a household faces 
a relatively high risk of not being able to finance its needs using its assets when an emergency 
occurs. This can also be an indication of higher background risk, which can prevent households 
from holding equity in the stock market. The estimation equation can be stated as:  
 1, ,..., , 0 1 , ,
1
logit(E[ | ])
n
j
i i m i i t j i t
j
hequity x x precaution controls  

  
    
(2-10) 
ℎ𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a household owns any equity and 0 otherwise. 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the precautionary saving index described in Section 2.5.1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a set of 
control variables, including age, gender, education, race, marital status, number of children, 
employment status, income, and wealth. In the logistic regression, the dependent variable is the 
log of the odds ratio, which can be stated as follows:  
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(2-11) 
The odds ratio is the probability of holding equity, 𝑝𝑖, divided by the probability of not holding 
any equity 1- 𝑝𝑖,. In the logistic regression, the log of the odds ratio is a linear function of the 
explanatory variables.  
[Insert Table 2-13 here] 
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 Table 2-13 presents the estimation results of equation (2-11). The precautionary index has 
a significantly positive effect on a household’s stock market participation decisions. However, the 
precise quantitative impact of this index cannot be obtained directly from the estimated coefficient 
as the estimated coefficient in the logistic results measures how a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variables results in a change in the log of the odds ratio, not the probability of holding 
equity. To interpret the results meaningfully, we need to estimate the marginal effect of the 
precautionary index on the probability of holding equity. The marginal effect is calculated for each 
observation, measuring how the change in the precautionary index will change the probability of 
holding equity:  
 
0
Pr( 1| X, x ) Pr( 1| X, x )
Marginal Effect of x lim
p p
p
Y Y

    

     
(2-12) 
where X is a vector of the control variables, evaluated at their original value for each observation. 
The marginal effect of 𝑥𝑝 is calculated by computing the difference between the predicted 
probability before and after a small change in 𝑥𝑝, and its value also depends on the value of the 
control variables.  As the control variables are different for each observation, the marginal effect 
of 𝑥𝑝 is different for each observation, and I take the average of the marginal effects across all 
observations.  
[Insert Table 2-14 here]  
 Table 2-14 reports the average marginal effect of the explanatory variables on stock market 
participation decisions. For the categorical variables, the marginal effect is taken to be the change 
in the predicted probability when the categorical variable changes from 0 to 1. For example, the 
average marginal effect for Race is 0.0794, indicating that for a white household (Race=1), the 
probability of holding equity will be 7.94 percentage points higher than it will for a non-white 
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household on average. For continuous variables, the interpretation of the coefficient is the effect 
of a small change in the explanatory variable on the change of predicted probability of holding 
equity. Since the log value of the precautionary index is used in estimating equation (2-11), the 
marginal effect can be used to assess the impact of a one percent change in the precautionary ratio 
on the change of the predicted probability of holding equity.  
 The results show that a one percent increase in the precautionary ratio will increase the 
predicted probability of holding equity by 0.0377 percentage points. A change in the precautionary 
index can be caused by a change in the desirable amount of emergency funds and/or a change in 
the available assets. The change in the precautionary index is not bounded by 100%, and its effect 
on the probability of holding equity can be quite substantial. Take a hypothetical scenario: for 
example, consider two households which have the same assets of $50,000 but one of which has a 
desirable amount of precautionary wealth of $10,000 and the other has a desirable amount of  
precautionary wealth of $20,000. The first household’s precautionary index is twice that of the 
second.  Taking the average marginal effect as an approximation, the lower precautionary index 
of the second household will decrease the probability of holding equity by 3.77 percentage points 
compared to the first household. 
2.5.3 Portfolio shares in risky assets  
 In this section, I estimate how the precautionary index affects the portfolio share invested 
in risky assets. The estimation equation can be stated as:  
 , 0 1 , , ,
1
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share precaution controls   
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   
    
(2-13) 
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where 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 measures the ratio of a household’s equity to its financial assets. For a robustness 
check, I also examine different measures of the portfolio share. I use a linear probability model to 
estimate equation (2-13). 
[Insert Table 2-15 here] 
 Table 2-15 presents the regression results of the impact of the precautionary index on share 
of the portfolio in risky assets. For the linear probability model, we can directly interpret the effect 
from the estimated coefficient of the regression results. The estimated coefficient of the 
precautionary index is positive and statistically significant. Taking the previously discussed 
hypothetical scenario, consider two households which have the same assets of $50,000 but one of 
which has a desirable amount of precautionary wealth of $10,000 and the other has a desirable 
amount of precautionary wealth of $20,000. The first household’s precautionary index is twice 
that of the second. Based on the estimation results shown in Table 2-15, the second household’s 
risky asset share would be 2.27 percentage points lower than that of the first.  
 Other variables, race, gender, education, marital status, unemployment status, income, and 
wealth, are also statistically significant and have the expected signs. Age has a non-linear effect 
on risky asset holdings as households typically hold a higher percentage of equity during their 
middle age than during either their young age or their old age. The number of children does not 
appear to have a significant impact on the portfolio share of risky assets.  
 Using only the desirable amount of precautionary wealth, Telyukova (2013) finds there is 
a positive relationship between desirable precautionary wealth and investment share in risky assets. 
He argues that a causality relationship exists between holding risky assets and the amount of 
desirable precautionary wealth. The risk entailed by holding stock enables households to hold more 
precautionary wealth as the risk in the overall household portfolio increases. By contrast, 
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households which hold only safe assets will significantly reduce the desirable level of 
precautionary wealth. In other words, the stronger demand for precautionary wealth reflects a 
higher level of risk incurred from investing in stocks. In his analysis, the desirable amount of 
precautionary wealth is endogenously determined by an exogenous level of risky asset holdings. 
However, the precautionary index, which is the ratio of total weighted assets to the desirable 
amount of emergency funds, can serve as a proxy for measuring the risk-bearing ability of the 
household, and the risk can include income risk as well as other background risks. The higher the 
value of the precautionary index, the better households can handle emergency risk, which can 
induce them to hold more equities. In other words, the share invested in risky assets is 
endogenously chosen to be commensurate with their ability to handle risk.  
2.6 Discussion  
2.6.1 Retirement accounts vs. non-retirement accounts 
 As argued in Carroll (1997, 1998), precautionary saving is an important reason for 
households to save, while saving for retirement does not seem to be a priority, especially for young 
households.  In the 1983 SCF, only 15% of the respondents said they were saving for retirement. 
However, as defined contribution plans become the major source of retirement funds and with the 
gradual phase-out of defined benefit plans, households have to save for their own retirement 
income by investing in bonds and stocks. In recent waves of the SCF, the percentage of households’ 
saving for retirement has increased: as shown in Table 2-7, 35% of all respondents indicate that 
they are saving mainly for retirement. Despite the increase in retirement saving, saving for 
precautionary purposes is also prevalent: 32% of all respondents in the SCF said they were saving 
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mainly for emergency and precautionary purposes. If households have equity invested both in their 
retirement accounts and outside their retirement accounts (in non-retirement accounts), the effect 
of the precautionary index on investments in these two types of accounts may be different. The 
hypothesis is that the precautionary ratio would have a smaller effect on investment behavior with 
regard to the retirement accounts as the investment horizon for retirement saving is usually longer 
than it is for precautionary saving.  Emergency needs often occur in the short run and demand 
more liquidity. The SCF provides detailed financial information on households’ retirement 
accounts and non-retirement accounts, and I estimate equations (2-11) and (2-13) for both 
retirement accounts and non-retirement accounts. For non-retirement accounts, equation (2-11) 
can be estimated as  
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(2-14) 
for the market participation decision, where ℎ𝑑𝑒𝑞 is a dummy variable indicating whether 
households hold any equity directly (i.e., outside their retirement accounts).  For retirement 
accounts, the equation is: 
 1, ,..., , 0 1 , ,
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(2-15) 
where ℎ𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  is a dummy variable indicating whether households hold any equity in their 
retirement accounts, such as 401(k) plans, IRAs, Keogh accounts, etc. The logistic results (not 
shown here) indicate that the effects of the precautionary index on households’ participation 
decisions do not differ much between retirement accounts and non-retirement accounts. However, 
the risky asset shares invested in these two types of accounts differ, so I will estimate (2-16) for 
these two types of accounts separately:  
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(2-16) 
For retirement accounts, the share is calculated by dividing the equity held in the retirement 
account by the total retirement assets. For the non-retirement accounts, the share is calculated by 
dividing directly held equity by total financial assets excluding retirement assets.  
[Insert Table 2-16 here] 
 Table 2-16 presents the estimation results using the linear probability model. Model I is for 
overall risky asset share. Model II and Model III show the results for non-retirement accounts and 
retirement accounts, respectively. A one-percent increase in the precautionary index will increase 
risky asset share in non-retirement accounts by 0.0176 percentage points and will increase the 
risky asset share in retirement accounts by 0.0109 percentage points. An increase in the 
precautionary index increases the risky asset share in both types of accounts; however, the impact 
is smaller for equity held in retirement accounts, and this is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
precautionary index should have a lower impact on long horizon investment behavior.  
2.6.2 Non-retired households vs. retired households  
 As documented in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), the desirable level of precautionary 
saving is important for two groups: older people and business owners. As shown in Table 2-12, 
the mean and the median desirable amounts of emergency funds are substantially higher for retired 
households.  In this section, I investigate whether the precautionary index has different effects for 
households with different retirement status. The next section will look at the behavior of the 
business owners.  
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[Insert Table 2-17 here] 
 Model I in Table 2-17 presents the results for the market participation decision regression 
with two additional variables: a dummy variable indicating the household head’s retirement status 
and an interaction term between the retirement dummy and the precautionary ratio. Being retired 
lowers the probability of participating in the stock market, holding other variables constant. 
However, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that the effect 
of the precautionary index is larger for retired households. Similar results also hold for the risky 
asset share regression. The precautionary ratio has a larger impact on retired households’ risky 
asset share. For non-retired households, a one-percent increase in the precautionary index will 
increase the risky asset share by 0.0213 percentage points, but for retired households, it will 
increase the risky asset share by an additional 0.0074 percentage points. For retired households, 
having more available resources can have an even more significant effect on their investment risk-
taking behavior. Further, not having enough resources to meet emergency needs can discourage 
retired households, more than non-retired households, from investing in risky assets.  
2.6.3 Business owners vs. non-business owners  
 Also as pointed out in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), business owners have a significantly 
higher desired level of precautionary saving. Heaton (2001) and Yilmazer and Scharff (2014) show 
that business owners are less likely to hold risky equity investment. In this subsection, I construct 
a dummy variable indicating a household’s business ownership status and add an interaction term 
between the business ownership dummy variable and the precautionary index in the regression 
analysis. Following the SCF documentation and Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), business owners 
are households that own a business in which they have an active management interest. In the 1995-
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2010 SCF sample, 30.2%, or 7,762 households, are identified as business owners. Households 
owning businesses have substantially higher median income, equity holding, and assets than non-
business owners. The median (weighted) equity holding for business owners is $20,000, whereas 
for non-business households, the median is $919. As business owners have higher net worth and 
can face higher background risk, the desirable level of precautionary wealth is also higher. For 
business owners, the median value is $12,254, but for non-business owners, the median value is 
$5,753.  
 Model II of Table 2-19 presents the estimation results by explicitly controlling for business 
ownership. We see that having a business increases the probability of participating in the stock 
market and investing in risky assets; however, having a business reduces the effects of the 
precautionary index on risk-taking behavior. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative 
and significant. For households having a business, a higher precautionary index still increases the 
risky asset share. However, the increase is 0.016 percentage points smaller as compared to 
households that do not have a business. As shown by the analysis regarding retirement status, 
having insufficient funds to meet emergency needs can be a major reason for retirees to be less 
likely to participate in the stock market, or to hold a lower share in risky assets if they do participate. 
For business owners, having sufficient funds to meet emergency needs is less important in 
determining their investment risk-taking behavior. There can be factors that affect business owners 
other than precautionary motives.  
2.6.4 Control for risk preference   
 As Kimball (1990) points out, the precautionary saving motive is closely related to the 
Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. It may be the case that households that are more risk averse 
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wish to hold more emergency funds than others when facing similar emergency situations. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that a higher precautionary index is the result of a more risk-averse 
preference. To address whether the precautionary index contains more information than just risk 
preference, I add a household risk taking preference variable as an additional control variable in 
the regression analysis, and it does not greatly change the previous results, which suggests that the 
precautionary ratio itself, independent of risk preference, is important in determining households’ 
risk taking decisions. Moreover, in Model III of Table 2-19, an interaction term between the risk 
averse dummy variable and the precautionary index is added to the regression analysis, and it has 
a positive and marginally significant effect. For households who are relatively more risk averse, a 
1% increase in the precautionary index will increase their risky asset share by an additional 0.0037 
percentage points as compared to households that are less risk averse.  
2.6.5 The effect of low normalized wealth  
[Insert Table 2-20 to Table 2-22 here] 
 As the empirical evidence in Section 2.3.2 and the optimal policy rule derived in Section 
2.4.6 show, households having a low normalized wealth level are less likely to participate in the 
stock market, and their risky asset share is lower when they do participate. Households’ ability to 
meet emergency consumption spending needs can be lower when their normalized wealth level is 
low, which reduces their investment risk-taking behavior. Other things being equal, a higher 
precautionary index can be particularly valuable for households whose normalized wealth level is 
low. In this section, I examine whether the precautionary index has a larger impact for households 
whose normalized wealth is relatively low. The mean normalized wealth ratio from the SCF is 1.8. 
I construct a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household’s normalized wealth is below 2 
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and equal to 0 otherwise. I also add an interaction term between the normalized wealth dummy 
variable and the precautionary ratio. Table 2-20 presents the results for the logit model. Table 2-22 
presents the results for the risky asset share model.  
 Households whose normalized wealth is below 2 are 26.5% less likely to participate in the 
stock market, and the risky asset share of their portfolios is 16.8 percentage points lower than that 
of households whose normalized wealth is above 2. However, the coefficients of the interaction 
term are positive and significant, indicating that for relatively low normalized wealth households, 
having a higher precautionary index can be more important in their investment behavior as 
compared to high wealth households. For low normalized wealth households, a one percent 
increase in the precautionary ratio increases the probability of stock market participation by an 
additional 0.01 percentage point and increases the risky asset share of their portfolios by an 
additional 0.009 percentage point.  
2.6.6 The impact of pension plans 
 Households’ saving and investment behavior can be affected if they have pension plans. 
Among the 25,647 households in the SCF 1995-2010 sample, 15,050 households had some 
pension plan, and 10,419 households reported no pension plan for either household head or spouse. 
It is interesting to observe whether the precautionary index has different effects for those who have 
a pension plan and those who do not have one. In addition, the type of the pension plan also differs 
among households. Generally, households have a defined contribution pension plan, a defined 
benefit pension plan, or both. Households with a defined contribution plan have to take more 
responsibility for their own retirement savings, and the composition of the retirement account is 
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entirely determined by the household’s choice. It is of interest to observe whether the precautionary 
index has a different impact for households with different types of pension plans.   
 To investigate these two issues, I conduct two sets of tests. First, I divide the whole sample 
into two subsamples: those who have a pension plan and those who do not. The regression results 
show there are no significant differences in their stock market participation decisions or in the 
risky asset share of their portfolios. In the second set of the test, I obtain a subsample which consists 
of 6,379 households with only a defined contribution plan and no defined benefit plan. I also obtain 
another subsample of 4,988 households that have only a defined benefit pension plan and no 
defined contribution plan. Among households that have defined benefit plans, half (2,453) still 
hold some additional retirement account, such as an IRA, Keogh, or thrift type account. I find no 
significant difference in the estimated effects of the precautionary index for households that have 
defined contribution plans versus those with defined benefit plans. The precautionary index 
reduces the risky asset share in both their non-retirement accounts and their retirement accounts, 
and the magnitude of reduction is similar for households regardless of their pension account type.   
2.7 Conclusion 
 This paper incorporates desired emergency saving for future expenditure shock into the 
power utility function and derives the optimal portfolio choice given this type of preference. 
Unexpected future expenditure or emergency needs can have a significant impact on a household’s 
risk taking behavior. Implications from the model better match the investment behavior observed 
in the empirical data. When the normalized wealth level is low, households’ stock market 
participation probability and risky asset share of their portfolios both increase as normalized wealth 
increases. Traditional “habit” models produce qualitatively similar results. However, the “habit” 
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models do not take emergency expenditure into consideration. The precautionary saving motive 
from these models arises purely from income shocks, not from expenditure shocks, which can be 
another major source of households’ background risk. This paper explicitly models this risk into 
households’ preferences.  
 After incorporating emergency expenditure into the habit model, this paper further 
constructs an index to measure how well households can manage emergency needs using their 
available assets. Better ability to meet unexpected expenditure or emergency needs can increase a 
household’s risk holding capacity and induce them to hold more risky investments. This research 
potentially expands on analyses found in the current literature to analyze asset allocation decisions 
in a more “liability induced” environment, where households need to take a certain type of future 
expenditure into consideration.  
 
  
  
42 
 
Table 2-1: Descriptive statistics for key variables in the SCF 
This table provides summary statistics for key variables in the SCF from 1995 to 2010. Liquid assets include assets in 
checking accounts, saving accounts, and money market funds. Financial assets include all liquid assets, CDs, Stocks, 
assets in retirement accounts, saving bonds, cash values of whole life insurance accounts, and other managed accounts. 
Equity includes directly held stocks, stock mutual funds, and stocks in combination mutual funds. All dollar amounts 
are in 2010 dollar value. All values are weighted using the weight provided by the SCF.  
 
Variable Definition Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Age In Years 49.4 47 17.24 28464 
 
Education 
 
Number of years  
 
13.2 
 
13 
 
2.86 
 
28464 
 
Gender 
 
=1 if male; =0 female 
 
0.72 
 
1 
 
0.44 
 
28464 
 
Married  
 
=1 if married  
 
0.59 
 
1 
 
0.49 
 
28464 
 
Children 
 
Number of Children 0.82 0 1.15 28464 
Race  =1 if white; =0 others 0.73 1 0.44 28464 
 
Unemployed 
 
=1 if unemployed in past 12 months 
0.11 0 0.33 28464 
 
Health Status 
 
Ordered Categorical Variable (1-4)  
1=Excellent; 2=Good; 3=Fair 4=Poor  
 
2.03 2 0.78 28464 
Risk Aversion Index 
Ordered Categorical Variable (1-4)  
1=Least Risk Averse 
4=Most Risk Averse  
3.19 3 0.85 28464 
 
Income  
 
Total Household Income 
 
78,106 
 
47,169 
 
292,236 
 
28464 
 
Liquid Asset  
 
Total Liquid Assets 
 
25,175 
 
3,221 
 
234,633 
 
28464 
 
Equity 
 
Total Equity Holdings 
 
105,607 
 
325 
 
947,510 
 
28464 
 
Financial Asset  
 
Total Financial Assets 
 
206,382 
 
22,497 
 
1,360,228 
 
28464 
 
Total Asset  
 
All Household Assets 
 
546,386 
 
173,714 
 
2,821,554 
 
28464 
 
Net Worth  
 
Total Household Wealth  
 
466,671 
 
98,511 
 
2,763,062 
 
28464 
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Table 2-2: Distribution of household normalized wealth level and risky asset share 
 
This table presents the distribution of households’ normalized wealth level and the risky asset share. Normalized 
wealth is defined as the ratio of the total financial wealth to the household’s income. Risky asset share is defined as 
the ratio of households’ total equity to total financial assets. All data are obtained from the SCF 1995-2010 waves and 
in 2010 dollars. Values are weighted using the weight provided by the SCF.  
 
 Mean P25  Median P75  P90 
      
Normalized Wealth Level 1.78 0.10 0.55 1.90 4.83 
Risky Asset Share      
All sample 0.25 0 0.10 0.48 0.77 
For Normalized Wealth >5  0.43 0.14 0.43 0.69 0.90 
For Normalized Wealth <5 0.21 0 0 0.38 0.70 
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Table 2-3: Normalized wealth regression (Logit model)  
This table presents the regression results for the normalized wealth regression. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if household holds any equity, and zero otherwise. Normalized wealth is defined as the ratio of the 
total financial wealth to the household’s income. NormD1 is a dummy variable indicating that the household’s 
normalized wealth is below 1 and NormD2 is a dummy variable indicating that the household’s normalized wealth is 
below 2. The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
confidence, respectively.   
  
Variables Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept -11.77*** 
(0.266) 
-10.045*** 
(0.2727) 
-11.041*** 
(0.2755) 
Normalized Wealth 0.2744*** 
(0.0133) 
 
0.1313*** 
(0.0100) 
0.1797*** 
(0.0133) 
NormD1  -1.2914*** 
(0.0532) 
 
NormD2   -0.6911*** 
(0.0711) 
Gender -0.1688*** 
(0.0592) 
-0.1443** 
(0.0601) 
-0.1639*** 
(0.593) 
Age 0.0412*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0354*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0414*** 
(0.0066) 
Age2 -0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
Education 0.1332*** 
(0.0077) 
0.1277*** 
(0.0078) 
0.1333*** 
(0.0077) 
Race 0.364*** 
(0.0421) 
0.3449*** 
(0.0430) 
0.3597*** 
(0.0421) 
Married 0.177*** 
(0.0542) 
0.2006*** 
(0.0550) 
0.1802*** 
(0.0542) 
Kids -0.0695*** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0682*** 
(0.0168) 
Unemployed -0.063 
(0.0578) 
-0.0388 
(0.0589) 
-0.0667*** 
(0.0579) 
Log(Income) 0.6789*** 
(0.0283) 
0.724*** 
(0.0283) 
0.6877*** 
(0.0283) 
Log(Net Worth) 0.1827*** 
(0.0139) 
0.1021*** 
(0.0140) 
0.1708*** 
(0.0138) 
 
N 20137 20137 20137 
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Table 2-4: Average Marginal Effect for the normalized wealth regression  
 
This table calculates the average marginal effect from the results of the logistic regressions in Table 2-3. Normalized 
wealth is defined as the ratio of the total financial wealth to the household’s income. NormD1 is a dummy variable 
indicating that the household’s normalized wealth is below 1, and NormD2 is a dummy variable indicating that the 
household’s normalized wealth is below 2.  
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Normalized Wealth 
 
0.0381 0.0175 0.0248 
NormD1 
 
 -0.1723  
NormD2 
 
  -0.0953 
Gender 
 
-0.0234 -0.0193 -0.0226 
Age 
 
0.0057 0.0047 0.0057 
Age2 
 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Education 
 
0.0185 0.0170 0.0184 
Race 
 
0.0505 0.0460 0.0496 
Married 
 
0.0246 0.0268 0.0249 
Kids 
 
-0.0096 -0.0070 -0.0094 
Unemployed 
 
-0.0087 -0.0052 -0.0092 
Log(Income)  
 
0.0942 0.0966 0.0949 
Log(Net Worth) 0.0253 0.0136 0.0236 
    
N 20137 20137 20137 
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Table 2-5: Normalized wealth regression (risky share regression) 
 
This table presents the results of the linear probability model for the normalized wealth regression. The dependent 
variable is the portfolio share invested in equity.  Normalized wealth is defined as the ratio of the total financial wealth 
to the household’s income. NormD1 is a dummy variable indicating that the household’s normalized wealth is below 
1 and NormD2 is a dummy variable indicating that the household’s normalized wealth is below 2. The standard error 
is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -0.6659*** 
(0.022) 
-0.4373*** 
(0.0229) 
-0.5347*** 
(0.0232) 
Normalized Wealth 0.0106*** 
(0.0005) 
 
0.0061*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0059*** 
(0.0006) 
NormD1  -0.1417*** 
(0.0048) 
 
NormD2   -0.0901*** 
(0.0054) 
Gender 0.0155** 
(0.0066) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0163** 
(0.0066) 
Age 0.0061*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0049*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0007) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Education 0.0191*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0164*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0181*** 
(0.0008) 
Race 0.0574*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0501*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0048) 
Married 0.0068 
(0.0058) 
0.0065 
(0.0057) 
0.0069 
(0.0058) 
Kids -0.0017 
(0.0018)*** 
-0.0005 
(0.0017) 
-0.0012 
(0.0017) 
Unemployed -0.0334 
(0.0067) 
-0.0283*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0331*** 
(0.0067) 
Log(Income)  0.027*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0355*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0301*** 
(0.0021) 
Log(Net Worth) 0.0181*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0129*** 
(0.0014) 
    R2 0.2472 0.2734 0.2558 
N 23702 23702 23702 
 
  
  
47 
 
Table 2-6: Risky asset share regression for different levels of normalized wealth 
 
This table presents the results of the linear probability model for the normalized wealth regression. The dependent 
variable is the portfolio share invested in equity. Normalized wealth is defined as the ratio of the total financial wealth 
to the household’s income. Model I is estimated based on the subsample where the household’s normalized wealth is 
below 2, and Model II is estimated based on the subsample where household’s normalized wealth is above 5.  The 
standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, 
respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II 
Intercept  0.1087*** 
(0.0361) 
0.0636 
(0.0084) 
Normalized Wealth 0.0634*** 
(0.0057) 
 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
Gender 0.0435** 
(0.0112) 
0.0289* 
(0.0177) 
Age 0.0067*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0040 
(0.0025) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
Education 0.0009*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0188*** 
(0.0023) 
Race 0.0369*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0733*** 
(0.0191) 
Married -0.0344 
(0.0058) 
-0.0090 
(0.0144) 
Kids 0.0022 
(0.0018)*** 
0.0052 
(0.0054) 
   R2 0.0362 0.0264 
N 8696 4115 
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Table 2-7: Saving motives in the SCF  
 
This table presents the distribution of different saving motives reported in the SCF 1995-2010 waves.  
 
Saving Motives Percentages in all samples 
For emergence, precautionary 31.5% 
For retirement 35.5% 
For education 10.0% 
For buying a house 3.3% 
For future expenditure on house improvement, vehicle, durable 
goods, vacations 
8.1% 
Other saving motive 8.6% 
Don’t/can’t save 3.1% 
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Table 2-8: Saving motive regression (Logit model) 
This table presents the regression results for the saving motive regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if the household holds any equity, and zero otherwise. Save1 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for 
precautionary purpose; Save2 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for retirement purposes; Save3 is equal to 1 if 
the household is saving for purchasing housing/durable goods and vacation purposes; Save4 is equal to 1 if the 
household is saving for other purposes. The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I  Model II Model III  Model IV  
Save1 -0.2008*** 
(0.0363) 
   
Save2  0.5409*** 
(0.0383)  
  
Save3   -0.1343*** 
(0.0516) 
 
Save4     -0.0501 
(0.0603) 
Gender -0.1935*** 
(0.0572) 
-0.1861*** 
(0.0575) 
-0.1880** 
(0.0572) 
-0.1899 
(0.0572) 
Age 0.0051*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0112* 
(0.0064) 
0.0051* 
(0.0063) 
0.0062 
(0.0063) 
Age2 -0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0001) 
Education 0.1537*** 
(0.0074) 
0.1534*** 
(0.0074) 
 
0.1539*** 
(0.0074) 
0.1542 
(0.0074) 
Race 0.3890*** 
(0.0418) 
 
0.3618*** 
(0.0421) 
0.4008*** 
(0.0418) 
0.3996 
(0.0418) 
Married 0.1190*** 
(0.0525) 
0.1051** 
(0.0528) 
0.124* 
(0.0525) 
0.1242 
(0.0525) 
Kids -0.0822*** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0547*** 
(0.0169) 
-0.0827** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0772 
(0.0172) 
Unemployed -0.0678 
(0.0597) 
-0.065 
(0.0583) 
-0.068 
(0.0578) 
-0.0677 
(0.0578) 
Log(Income)  0.5377*** 
(0.0265) 
0.5178*** 
(0.0264) 
0.5408*** 
(0.265) 
0.5425 
(0.0265) 
Log(Net Worth) 0.3772*** 
(0.0128 
0.3711*** 
(0.0128) 
0.3737*** 
(0.0128) 
0.3765 
(0.0127) 
     N 24131 24131 24131 
 
24131 
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Table 2-9: Average marginal effect for the saving motive regression 
This table calculates the average marginal effect from the results of the logistic regressions in Table 2-8. Save1 is 
equal to 1 if the household is saving for precautionary purposes; Save2 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for 
retirement purposes; Save3 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for housing/durable goods and vacation purposes; 
Save4 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for other purposes. 
 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Save1 
 
-0.0288    
Save2 
 
 0.0767   
Save3 
 
  -0.0193  
Save4 
 
   -0.0072 
Gender 
 
-0.0277 -0.0263 -0.027 -0.0272 
Age 
 
0.0007 -0.0016 0.0007 0.0009 
Age2 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Education 
 
0.0220 0.0217 0.0221 0.0221 
Race 
 
0.0557 0.0512 0.0575 0.0573 
Married 
 
0.0170 0.0149 0.0178 0.0178 
Kids 
 
-0.0118 -0.0077 -0.0119 -0.0111 
Unemployed 
 
-0.0097 -0.0092 -0.0097 -0.0097 
Log(Income) 
 
0.0770 0.0733 0.0776 0.0778 
Log(Net Worth) 0.0540 0.0526 0.0536 0.0540 
N 24131 24131 24131 24131 
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Table 2-10: Saving motive regression (linear probability model)  
This table presents the regression results for the saving motive regression. The dependent variable is the portfolio 
share invested in equity. Save1 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for precautionary purposes; Save2 is equal to 1 
if the household is saving for retirement purposes; Save3 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for housing/durable 
goods and vacation purposes; Save4 is equal to 1 if the household is saving for other purposes. The standard error is 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I  Model II Model III  Model IV 
Intercept  -0.6727*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.6451*** 
(0.022) 
-0.6744*** 
(0.0222) 
-0.6903*** 
(0.0220) 
Save1 -0.0278*** 
(0.0040) 
   
Save2  0.0613*** 
(0.0040) 
 
  
Save3   -0.0256*** 
(0.0061) 
 
 
Save4     0.0017 
(0.0064) 
Gender 0.0130** 
(0.0066) 
( 
( 
0.0131** 
(0.0066) 
 
0.0138** 
(0.0066) 
0.0136** 
(0.0066) 
Age 0.0040*** 
(0.0007) 
 
0.0019** 
(0.0007) 
0.004*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0007) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Education 0.0209*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0204*** 
(0.0008) 
0.021*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0211*** 
(0.0008) 
Race 0.0554*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0515*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0570*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0570*** 
(0.0049) 
Married 0.0019 
(0.0058) 
-0.0017 
(0.0058) 
0.0029 
(0.0059) 
0.0031 
(0.0059) 
Kids -0.0037** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0006 
(0.0018) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0018) 
Unemployed -0.0293*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0276*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0296*** 
(0.0068) 
Log(Income)  0.0194*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0202*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0194*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0194*** 
(0.0021) 
Log(Net Worth) 0.0306*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0299*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0300*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0304*** 
(0.0013) 
     
R2 0.2372 0.2429 0.2358 0.2429 
N 24131 24131 24131 24131 
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Table 2-11: Model parameter values  
This table presents the benchmark parameter values for the model calibration. Preference parameters, labor income 
parameters, and financial market parameters are obtained from Cocco et al. (2005). The emergency fund/permanent 
income ratio is calibrated from data from the Survey of Consumer Finance.  
 
Description  Parameter Value  
Preference Parameters:  
Retirement age ( K )  65 
Life span (T) 100 
Discount factor ( ) 0.96 
Risk aversion ( ) 7 
 
Labor Income Parameters: 
 
Variance of Permanent Labor Income Shock 0.074 
Variance of Transitory Labor Income Shock  0.011 
Replacement rate 0.682 
  
Emergency fund / Permanent Income  ratio 0.48 
  
Financial Market Parameters:  
Riskless rate (
fr ) 0.02 
Mean of stock return (  ) 0.06 
Standard Deviation of stock return (  ) 0.157 
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Table 2-12: Summary statistics for the emergency fund   
This table presents the summary statistics for the desirable amount of emergency funds for the overall sample, and for 
subsamples based on wealth status, health status, and retirement status. All samples are weighted using the weight 
provided by the SCF.  
 
Sample Mean Median St Dev    N 
Overall Sample: 25,511 5,762 196,974 28,464 
Panel A: By Wealth Status:     
      Above Median 38,194 11,330 67,662 16,822 
      Below Median 9,635 3,000 141,702 11,058 
Panel B: By Retirement Status:      
        Non-Retired  21,839 5,665 162,536 4,935 
        Retired  40,600 10,000 298,971 28,464 
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Table 2-13: Stock market participation regression (Logit model) 
This table presents the logistic regression results for stock market participation. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if the household holds any equity and 0, otherwise. PRatio1 is log of (weighted available 
resource/desirable amount of emergency funds), PRatio2 is log of (income/ desirable amount of emergency funds), 
and PRatio3 is log of ((financial asset-retirement asset)/ desirable amount of emergency funds). Standard error is in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -13.2541*** 
(0.2457) 
-7.1634*** 
(0.1681) 
-12.5954*** 
(0.2479) 
PRatio1 
0.2532*** 
(0.0108) 
  
PRatio2  0.0342*** 
(0.0114) 
 
PRatio3   
0.2803*** 
(0.0088) 
Gender 
-0.0529 
(0.0541) 
0.2395*** 
(0.0495) 
-0.0384 
(0.0543) 
 
 
Age 
0.0336** 
(0.0059) 
0.0990*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0599*** 
(0.0059) 
Age2 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
Education 
0.1808*** 
(0.0071) 
0.2915*** 
(0.0066) 
0.1637*** 
(0.0072) 
Race 
0.4564*** 
(0.0397) 
0.686*** 
(0.0368) 
0.4366*** 
(0.0398) 
Married 
0.0873* 
(0.0501) 
0.6036*** 
(0.0453) 
0.1653*** 
(0.0503) 
Kids 
-0.092** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0248* 
(0.0148) 
-0.0479*** 
(0.0161) 
Unemployed 
-0.1183*** 
(0.054) 
-0.5411*** 
(0.0508) 
-0.1165** 
(0.0545) 
Income  
 
0.0059*** 
(0.0007) 
 
 
Log(Income) 
0.8799** 
(0.0234)  
0.8246*** 
(0.0235) 
Net Worth 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
N 25465 25465 25465 
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Table 2-14: Average marginal effect for the stock market participation regression 
This table calculates the average marginal effect from the results of the logistic regressions in Table 2-13. PRatio1 is 
log of (weighted available resource/desirable amount of emergency funds), PRatio2 is log of (income/ desirable 
amount of emergency funds), and PRatio3 is log of ((financial asset-retirement asset)/ desirable amount of 
emergency funds). 
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
PRatio1 
 
0.0377   
PRatio2 
 
 0.0058  
PRatio3 
 
  0.0406 
Gender 
 
-0.0079 0.0407 -0.0056 
Age 
 
0.0050 0.0168 0.0087 
Age2 
 
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Education 
 
0.0269 0.0495 0.0237 
Race 
 
0.0679 0.1165 0.0632 
Married 
 
0.013 0.1026 0.0239 
Kids 
 
-0.0137 -0.0042 -0.0069 
Unemployed 
 
-0.0176 -0.0919 -0.0169 
Income  0.0010  
Log(Income)  
 
0.1308  0.1193 
Net Worth 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
N 25465 25465 25465 
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Table 2-15: Precautionary ratio regression (linear probability model) 
This table presents the results for the linear probability model of the precautionary ratio regression. The dependent 
variable is the risky asset share in financial assets. PRatio1 is log of (weighted available resource/desirable amount 
of emergency funds), PRatio2 is log of (income/ desirable amount of emergency funds), and PRatio3 is log of 
((financial asset-retirement asset)/ desirable amount of emergency funds). The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, respectively. 
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -0.8833*** 
(0.0207) 
-0.6728*** 
(0.0193) 
-0.8333*** 
(0.0212) 
PRatio1 0.0227*** 
(0.0011) 
  
PRatio2  0.0083*** 
(0.0013) 
 
PRatio3   0.0192*** 
(0.0009) 
Gender 0.0227*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0538*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0063) 
Age 0.0063*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0128*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0007) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Education 0.0222*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0352*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0208*** 
(0.0008) 
Race 0.0596*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0883*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0594*** 
(0.0047) 
Married -0.0037 
(0.0057) 
0.0393*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0023 
(0.0056) 
Kids -0.0041** 
(0.0017) 
0.0018 
(0.0018) 
-0.0014 
(0.0017) 
Unemployed -0.0288*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0293*** 
(0.0063) 
Income 0.0547*** 
(0.0017) 
0.00001 
(0.0000) 
 
Log(Income)    0.0516*** 
(0.0018) 
Net Worth -0.00001 
(0.0000) 
0.00001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00005*** 
(0.0000) 
    Adj R2 25465 25465 25465 
N 0.2379 0.1847 0.2394 
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Table 2-16: Risky Asset share regression (retirement account vs. non-retirement account) 
This table presents the results for the linear probability model of the risky asset share regression. In Model I, the 
dependent variable is the ratio of total risky assets to all financial assets. In Model II, the dependent variable is the 
ratio of total direct held equity to all non-retirement financial assets. In Model III, the dependent variable is the share 
of risky assets in a retirement account. PRatio is log of (weighted available resource/desirable amount of emergency 
funds). The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -0.3532*** 
(0.0310) 
-0.7817*** 
(0.0309) 
-0.0135 
(0.0386) 
PRatio 0.0147*** 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0176*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0021) 
Gender 0.0481*** 
((0.0092) 
0.0376*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0517*** 
(0.0115) 
Age 0.0051*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0001 
(0.9641) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00001*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Education 0.0188*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0212*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0161*** 
(0.0014) 
Race 0.0516*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0542*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0466*** 
(0.0082) 
Married -0.0352*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.0096) 
Kids 0.0002 
(0.0022) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0027 
(0.0027) 
Unemployed -0.0104 
(0.0096) 
0.0047 
(0.0096) 
-0.0156 
(0.012) 
Log(Income)  0.0264*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0496*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0298*** 
(0.0027) 
Net Worth -0.00001** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001*** 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
    Adj R2 0.0798 0.1532 0.0583 
N 16058 16058 16058 
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Table 2-17: Stock market participation regression (control for different status) 
This table presents the results for the stock market participation regression of different groups. The dependent variable 
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the household holds any equity and 0, otherwise. Model I controls for retirement 
status; Model II controls for business ownership status; Model III controls for investment risk preferences. The 
standard error is in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, 
respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -13.3294 
(0.2495) 
-6.8721*** 
(0.1700) 
 
-12.2270*** 
 (0.2523) 
PRatio 0.2417*** 
(0.0119) 
0.3680*** 
(0.0117) 
0.2254*** 
(0.0244) 
Retired -0.0646 
(0.0983) 
  
PRatio*Retired 0.0622** 
(0.0276) 
  
HBUS  0.5917*** 
(0.0900) 
 
PRatio*HBUS  -0.1845*** 
(0.0265) 
 
Riska   -0.7476*** 
(0.0789) 
PRatio*Riska   0.0280 
(0.0265) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  
    
N 25670 25859 25859 
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Table 2-18: Average marginal effect for Stock market participation regressions  
This table calculates the average marginal effect from the results of the logistic regressions in Table 2-17. Model I 
controls for retirement status; Model II controls for business ownership status; Model III controls for investment risk 
preferences. 
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
PRatio 0.0360 0.0588 0.0331 
Retired -0.0095   
PRatio*Retired 0.0093   
HBUS  0.0945  
PRatio*HBUS  -0.0295  
Riska   -0.1098 
PRatio*Riska   0.0041 
N 25670 25859 25859 
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Table 2-19: Risky asset share regressions (control for different status) 
This table presents the results for the linear probability regression of the risky asset share model. Model I controls for 
retirement status; Model II controls for business ownership status; Model III controls for investment risk preferences. 
The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, 
respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  -0.8846*** 
(0.0210) 
-0.9390*** 
(0.0220) 
 
-0.6869*** 
(0.0220) 
PRatio 0.0213*** 
(0.0012) 
0.02708*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0186*** 
(0.0021) 
Retired -0.0178* 
(0.0101) 
  
PRatio*Retired 0.0074*** 
(0.0026) 
  
HBUS  0.02155*** 
(0.0094) 
 
 
PRatio*HBUS  -0.0160*** 
(0.0025) 
 
Riska   -0.1302*** 
(0.0081) 
PRatio*Riska   0.0037* 
(0.0023) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  
    R2 0.2381 0.2405 0.2613 
N 25465 25465 25465 
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Table 2-20: Stock market participation regression (control for normalized wealth) 
This table presents the logistic regression results for stock market participation, controlling for normalized wealth. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the household holds any equity and 0, otherwise. PRatio is 
log (weighted available resource/desirable amount of emergency funds). Normd is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a household’s normalized wealth is below 2 or not. Normd*PRatio is the interaction term between PRatio 
and Normd. The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
of confidence, respectively.   
 
Variables  Model I Model II 
Intercept  -13.2541*** 
(0.2457) 
-10.5081*** 
(0.2702) 
PRatio 0.2532*** 
(0.0108) 
0.1286*** 
(0.0282) 
Normd  -1.8921*** 
(0.1061) 
 
Normd*PRatio  0.0731** 
(0.0304) 
Gender -0.0529 
(0.0541) 
-0.0695 
(0.0558) 
Age 0.0336** 
(0.0059) 
0.0429*** 
(0.0061) 
Age2 -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
Education 0.1808*** 
(0.0071) 
0.1539*** 
(0.0074) 
Race 0.4564*** 
(0.0397) 
0.3607*** 
(0.0404) 
Married 0.0873* 
(0.0501) 
0.1253** 
(0.0516) 
Kids -0.092** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0758*** 
(0.0161) 
Unemployed -0.1183*** 
(0.054) 
-0.0970* 
(0.0545) 
Log(Income)  0.8799** 
(0.0234) 
0.8351*** 
(0.0239) 
Net Worth -0.0001 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
N 25465 25465 
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Table 2-21: Average marginal effect for the stock market participation regression  
This table calculates the average marginal effect from the logistic regression in Table 2-20. PRatio1 is log (weighted 
available resource/desirable amount of emergency funds). Normd is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
household’s normalized wealth is below 2 or not. Normd*PRatio is the interaction term between PRatio and Normd.  
 
Variables  Model II Model I 
PRatio1 
 
0.0180 0.0377 
Normd -0.2652  
PRatio*Normd 0.0102  
Gender 
 
-0.0097 -0.0079 
Age 
 
0.006 0.005 
Age2 
 
-0.0001 -0.0001 
Education 
 
0.0216 0.0269 
Race 
 
0.0506 0.0679 
Married 
 
0.0176 0.013 
Kids 
 
-0.0106 -0.0137 
Unemployed 
 
-0.0136 -0.0176 
Log(Income)  
 
0.1171 0.1308 
Net Worth 0.0001 0.00001 
N 25465 25465 
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Table 2-22: Risky asset share regression (control for normalized wealth) 
This table presents the results for the linear probability regression of the risky asset share estimation. PRatio is log 
(weighted available resource/desirable amount of emergency funds). Normd is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a household’s normalized wealth is below 2 or not. Normd*PRatio is the interaction term between PRatio and Normd. 
The standard error is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of confidence, 
respectively. 
 
Variables  Model I Model II 
Intercept  -0.8833*** 
(0.0207) 
-0.5607*** 
(0.0237) 
PRatio1 0.0227*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0100*** 
(0.0021) 
Normd  -0.1658*** 
(0.0090) 
PRatio*Normd  0.0090*** 
(0.0024) 
Gender 0.0227*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0062) 
Age 0.0063*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0007) 
Age2 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Education 0.0222*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0181*** 
(0.0008) 
Race 0.0596*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0488*** 
(0.0046) 
Married -0.0037 
(0.0057) 
-0.003 
(0.0056) 
Kids -0.0041** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0023 
(0.0017) 
Unemployed -0.0288*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.0062) 
Log(Income)  0.0547*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0481*** 
(0.0017) 
Net Worth -0.00001 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001*** 
(0.0000) 
 
   Adj R2 0.2379 0.2662 
N 25465 25465 
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Figure 2-1: Labor income process: age profile 
This figures plots fitted third-order polynomials of the labor income process for both high school graduates and 
college graduates.  
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Figure 2-2: Policy rules for portfolio choice (without contingent consumption) 
This figure plots the optimal portfolio share invested in stocks at different normalized wealth levels and for different 
stages of the life cycle when no contingent consumption is considered.  
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Figure 2-3: Policy rules for portfolio choice (with contingent consumption) 
This figure plots the optimal portfolio share invested in stocks at different normalized wealth levels and for different 
stages of the life cycle when contingent consumption is considered.  
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Figure 2-4: Optimal policy rule for normalized wealth level below 5 
 
This figure plots the optimal portfolio share invested in stocks at different normalized levels (below 5) and for 
different stages of the life cycle when contingent consumption is considered. 
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Chapter 3  
Tail Risk, Health Risk, and Portfolio Choice for Retirees 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 The theory of asset allocation predicts that investment in risky assets depends on investors’ 
risk preference, along with the mean and the volatility of stock market returns (Merton, 1971). 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that individual investment behavior is affected by factors that 
are not emphasized in classical portfolio choice theory. One factor that has important implications 
for asset allocation decisions is investors’ human capital. In an incomplete financial market, 
individuals cannot fully hedge their labor risk. Fluctuations in labor income, therefore, is a major 
risk associated with human capital. Subsequent research on the life cycle model has incorporated 
human capital risk into the analysis and derived the optimal behavior that better matches the 
empirical data.  
 For retirees, the risk of human capital can be different. Major income sources for retirees 
are from Social Security and pension benefits, which normally are not subject to business cycles 
or periods of unemployment; therefore, their income is less risky compared to working individuals’ 
income. However, increased health risk among retirees can be seen as another type of shock to 
their human capital.  Health shock can significantly affect their budget constraints, consumption 
behaviors, and financial decisions. In additional to health risks, another important risk of investing 
in the stock market for retirees is the risk of financial crisis. A financial crisis is characterized by 
a disastrous outcome in the stock market, which has a small probability of occurrence. Since 
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retirees’ investment horizon is shorter, and their ability to recover from a loss is lower than that of 
working individuals, a financial disaster’s detrimental effect on wealth can be large enough to 
reduce their equity holdings. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing retirees’ 
consumption and financial decisions when they are faced with these two important risks, using a 
structural life-cycle model.  
 This study is related to three strands of research: work on the application of the life cycle 
model to the study of households’ optimal behavior, work on health and portfolio choice, and work 
on the tail risk associated with rare events in financial markets. By unifying these three strands in 
the literature, I attempt to study retirees’ consumption decisions and portfolio choices when they 
are faced with realistic health risk and rare event risk in the financial markets.  
 The literature on the life cycle of consumption starts with Friedman’s life cycle and the 
permanent income hypothesis, which state that individuals’ current consumption should be 
determined by their expected lifetime income, not just by their current income. The life cycle 
model has since become the basis for studying dynamic household behavior (Cocco and Maenhout, 
2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Wachter and Yogo, 2010). The life cycle model has also 
been used to study retirement behavior. Blau (2008) studies a life cycle model where households, 
uncertain about the time of retirement, experience a sharp decline in consumption at the time of 
retirement. Huang et al. (2012) solve for retirees’ optimal consumption rate in a life cycle model 
where the mortality rate is stochastic and learnable from health status. Kremer et al. (2013) derive 
retirees’ optimal consumption and portfolio choices using a logistic model of mortality.  Ding 
(2014) develops a life-cycle model incorporating a bequest motive, housing decisions, and public 
pensions for retirees. The model is calibrated to ABS data from the Household Expenditure Survey 
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and the Survey of Income and Housing. Their model can reasonably explain the financial behavior 
of surveyed households and the concentration of wealth in housing for retirees in Australia. 
 This paper is also related to the study of health and portfolio choice. Health risk is one of 
the important background risks that affect households’ financial decisions. Rosen (2004) finds that 
households in poor health are less likely to hold risky financial assets after controlling for their 
attitudes toward risk, planning horizon, and health insurance availability. Edwards (2008) finds 
that adverse health shocks to retirees in the future may explain twenty percent of the age-related 
decline in financial risk-taking after retirement. De Nardi et al. (2010) argue that the most 
important reason that the elderly save is longevity risk and rising out-of-pocket medical expense 
with age. Coile and Milligan (2009) find that households decrease their ownership of housing, 
vehicles, financial assets, and businesses as they age and increase their share in safe assets in the 
presence of a health shock. They also find that the effect of health shocks on safe asset holding 
strengthens with time after the shock. Finkelstein et al. (2013) find that the marginal utility of 
consumption declines as health deteriorates.  
 In addition to the reduced form estimation, some studies use a structural model to explain 
how health affects households’ financial decisions. Yogo (2009) develops a life-cycle model where 
retirees choose health expenditures endogenously in response to the stochastic depreciation of 
health.  The model is calibrated to explain the joint dynamics of health expenditure, health, and 
asset allocation for retirees in the Health and Retirement Study. Hugonnier et al. (2012) develop a 
dynamic model where households make consumption, portfolio, health investment, and health 
insurance decisions jointly. Scholz and Seshadri (2013) develop a life cycle model to study 
consumption and health investment choices where health affects both longevity and the utility 
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function. The model’s result matches the distribution of medical expenses across households in 
the data. 
 Third, this paper is related to the literature on tail risk and rare events in financial markets. 
Liu et al. (2005) find that uncertainty aversion to rare events plays an important role in option 
premium. Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) find that compensation for rare events accounts for a 
large fraction of the equity and variance risk premium in the S&P 500 market index. Gabaix (2012) 
finds that the possibility of rare, large disasters affects risk premium, and suggests that fear of 
disaster can be viewed as a tractable way to model time-varying risk-aversion or investor sentiment. 
Wachter (2013) finds that a small possibility of a large decline in consumption can substantially 
increase equity premium. Time-variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock 
market volatility and excess return predictability.  
 While many rare event studies focus on  their effects on asset pricing, fewer look at how 
they directly affect investors’ decisions in a life-cycle model context. One study that has 
incorporated the disaster factor into the life-cycle model is reported in Kolusheva (2011), where 
she develops a life-cycle model with possible rare disasters in the stock market and the labor 
market to analyze investors’ consumption and asset allocation decisions. In her paper, rare 
disasters are calibrated to match the joint empirical distribution of stock market crashes and 
macroeconomic contractions. She finds that a small probability of disaster is sufficient to deter 
median investors from investing in stocks during their working life.  
 The model in this paper differs from that in Kolusheva (2011) in two important aspects: 
First, the length of the investment horizon; and second, the nature of human capital shock. Her 
paper emphasizes the whole life cycle, from early working life until death, whereas mine focuses 
on retirees’ behavior. In her model, the shock to permanent income comes from the risk of 
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macroeconomic contraction, which affects an investor only during his working life. The insulation 
from labor market risk after retirement implies that retirees will hold more risky assets than before 
retirement, an implication which does not hold empirically. This paper addresses this issue by 
considering health risk as a shock to retirees’ human capital; the shock is idiosyncratic and does 
not correlate with general stock market crisis.  
 This paper will proceed as follows: Section 3.2 sets up the model. Section 3.3 describes 
parameter values and calibrates the model using data from the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS). Section 3.4 describes the model and presents the results of optimal behavior under different 
scenarios. Section 3.5 extends the model to incorporate heterogeneous health risk. Section 3.6 
presents the simulation results and compares the results with the empirical distribution of risky 
asset holdings in the Health and Retirement Survey, and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 The Model  
3.2.1 The preference  
 Retiree i’s preference is characterized by a time-separable power utility function:                  
 
11
1
1 1 1
1 1
( )
1
T t
i t it
j
t j
C
U E p






 


   (3-1) 
The retiree is assumed to live a maximum of T  periods. In each period, there is a possibility that 
the retiree will die. Let tp  denote the probability that the retiree is alive at date 1t  , conditional 
on being alive at date t. The retiree maximizes expected life utility with a constant relative risk 
aversion   and time preference parameter  . Values for these parameters will be discussed in 
Section 3.3.  
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3.2.2 Modeling health shock  
 Each period, retirees will receive pension and Social Security benefits as labor income. The 
riskiness of labor income plays an important role in an investor’s investment behavior and needs 
to be taken into consideration when solving the life-cycle model. Previous literature (e.g. Carroll, 
1997; Winter et al. 2012) show that the risky labor income process can be modeled as having a 
deterministic component and stochastic components. In my model, labor income is assumed to be 
at a fixed level, as income from social security and pension is normally not subjected to labor 
market fluctuation3. For retirees, however, health risk can be a major shock to their income stream. 
I model the magnitude of a health shock to be proportional to their income, and the income after 
health shock is specified as:  
 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖 × ℎ𝑖,𝑡 (3-2) 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0,1]. When ℎ𝑖,𝑡= 0, there will be no health shock for the period; health expenditure 
will be zero, and the retiree’s disposable income will be equal to his social security/pension 
income. When ℎ𝑖,𝑡 > 0, there will be a health shock for the period, and the retiree’s disposable 
income will be reduced. ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is bounded above by 1, so the maximum health expenditure will not 
exceed current income; i.e., 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 has a lower bound of zero. For each period, the health expenditure 
ratio, ℎ𝑖,𝑡, can be different, and the retiree knows the realization of ℎ𝑖,𝑡 only when he enters that 
period. However, the retiree has prior knowledge of the distribution of 
,i t
h and optimizes his 
                                                 
3 In the life-cycle model developed by Cocco et al. (2005), retirement income is modeled as a constant fraction of 
permanent labor income in the last working year before retirement.  
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behavior based on his expectation of ℎ𝑖,𝑡.The distribution of ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is estimated using data from the 
Health and Retirement Survey and will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.  
3.2.3 The financial market 
 Each period, investors can invest in two assets in the financial market: a riskless and a risky 
asset. The riskless asset has a return 𝑟𝑓 for each period. For the risky asset, there are two states: a 
non-crisis state characterized by a mean risk premium of 𝜇 and an innovation component  𝜂𝑡+1:  
 1
noncrash
t tf
r r       (3-3) 
where 𝜂𝑡+1 is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) as 
2(0, )N  . There is 
also a non-zero probability 𝜋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ  that the stock market will crash, and stock return will be ?̃?𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 
if the market crashes.  Combining these two states, we can express the risky asset return as: 
 
with probability 1-
with probability 
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,    
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crash
crash
crash
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r


  (3-4) 
The parametrizations of 𝑟𝑓, 𝜇, 
2
 , 𝜋
𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ , and ?̃?𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ will be discussed in Section  3.3.  
3.2.4 Retirees’ optimization problem  
 For simplicity, this model assumes that the health risk is exogenous and that the retiree 
does not choose the amount of health care; rather, he takes it as a shock which reduces his 
disposable income, and he makes his optimal consumption and asset allocation decisions 
accordingly. The timing of the events is as follows: at the beginning of each period t, the retiree 
starts with financial wealth 𝑊𝑡, receives a pension income 𝑌𝑖, And observes the health shock ℎ𝑖,𝑡 to 
his income. The uncertainty associated with disposable income dissipates once the retiree enters 
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period t.  Following Deaton (1991) and Cocco et al. (2005), I denote the total available resources 
as cash-at-hand 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖,𝑡. ,i tX  is the total amount of available resources for the 
retiree during the period t, and his problem is to decide how much to consume in this period 𝐶𝑡.  
The resources not consumed will be saved and used to generate the next period’s financial 
wealth,  𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1. The financial market offers two available assets for saving: one risk-free asset and 
one risky asset. The retiree needs to make an allocation decision (i.e., the portfolio share that will 
be invested in risky assets, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡). After the consumption decision and the asset allocation decision 
have been made, his financial wealth at the beginning of the next period t+1 , will be: 
 , 1 , 1( )
p
i t i t it it it
W r W Y C
 
    (3-5) 
The return of the portfolio from time t to time t+1 is given by:  
 , 1 1 (1 ) .
p
i t it t it f
r r r 
 
    (3-6) 
where it  is the portfolio share invested in risky assets and (1 )it  is the portfolio share invested 
in the risk-free asset. Assuming the retiree faces borrowing constraints and cannot short-sell the 
risk-free asset,   is restrained to 1. The retiree’s optimization problem is to maximize the 
objective function (3-1) subject to constraints (3-2) through (3-6). The state variables are 
{ , , }tt X Y , and the control (choice) variables are{ , }t tC  . For each period, the optimal rules of 
consumption and portfolio share are functions of the state variables , , andtt X Y .   
The Bellman equation for a retiree’s optimization problem is given by:   
 𝑉𝑖𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = max
𝐶𝑖𝑡≥0,0≤𝛼𝑖𝑡≤1 
[𝑈(𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1],     𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 (3-7) 
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where ( )it itV X is the value function, denoting the maximized utility given itX , and the next period 
total resource 𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 is: 
 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tX W Y h        (3-8) 
Substituting (3-5) and (3-6) into (3-8), 
, 1i tX   can be expressed as: 
 , 1 1 , 1( )( (1 ) ) (1 )i t it it it t it f i i tX X C r r Y h           (3-9) 
where 
, 1i tX   depends on the amount of saving this period, the return on the savings (which in term 
depends on the portfolio choice it ), and the next period’s health shock. 
 Since this model does not have a closed form analytical solution, I use a numerical method 
to find the value function and the associated optimal policy rules. Unlike an infinite period dynamic 
programming problem, this model has finite periods as the retiree can live only a maximum of T  
years. Specifically, the retiree retires at 65 and is expected to live 30 years after retirement. A finite 
period setting allows us to solve the model recursively from the last period. The procedure is as 
follows: set the retiree’s last period value function TV  equal to zero as he dies at time T, and assume 
there is no bequest motive. Given this condition, substitute TV =0 into the Bellman equation (3-7), 
and the optimal value for  𝑉𝑇−1, which is the utility function evaluated at total cash-at-hand, at T-
1.  Having found 1TV  , we can solve for 2TV  , and so on. The process continues until 1( )V x , which 
is the value function at the beginning of the period, is found. The value functions of a finite horizon 
discrete Markov decision model are always well defined. By finding the value functions for each 
period, we can also obtain the optimal consumption and portfolio choice for each period, which 
generate the value function. 
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 As demonstrated in previous literature (Carrol, 1997; Cocco et al., 2005; Kolusheva, 2011), 
it is possible to reduce the state variable space by normalizing wealth with respect to permanent 
income, which is a constant pension level Y in this case.  Results in Section 3.4 will be expressed 
in terms of the normalized version of the cash-at-hand variable and the consumption variable. 
3.3  Parameters and Model Calibration  
[Insert Table 3-1 here] 
 To solve the model, we need to choose appropriate parameter values for retirees’ 
preference and financial market parameters. For retirees’ risk preference and standard financial 
market parameters, I use the standard values obtained from Cocco et al. (2005) and Kolusheva 
(2011). Table 3-1 provides a summary of the values of the benchmark parameters. The coefficient 
of relative risk aversion is set to 7, and the risk-free rate, mean of stock market return, and standard 
deviation of stock market return are set to 0.02, 0.06 and 0.15, respectively. The retiree dies with 
a probability of one at age 95. Prior to this age, the conditional survival probability value,
jp , is 
obtained from the mortality tables of the National Center for Health Statistics.  
 The parameter values for 𝜋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ and ?̃?𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ are obtained from Barro and Ursua (2009) and 
Kolusheva (2011), where market crashes are defined as peak-to-trough cumulative real returns of 
-25% or worse. Kolusheva (2011) finds that the unconditional probability of a stock market crash 
is 10.11%, and the probability of a stock market crash and no economic contraction is 7.47%. 
Ideally, the model used in this paper should also be calibrated using the empirical distribution of 
historical stock market crashes. To simplify the analysis, however, I set the stock return of a market 
crash, ?̃?𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ,  to be -20%, close to the upper bound of the market crash return documented in Barro 
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and Urusa (2009). I set the probability of a crash to be 8%, close to the value found in Kolusheva 
(2011). With this parameterization, the market crash can happen with a probability of 8%, and the 
return will be -20% when it happens. Similar optimal policy rules can be drawn when the crash 
return is set to -25% and the crash probability is 10%.  The only parameter that needs to be 
estimated is the magnitude and distributional properties of the health expenditure shock.   
3.3.1 Health expenditure calibration  
 In this section, I use the data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to characterize 
the empirical distribution of the health expenditure ratio. The Health and Retirement Survey is a 
biannual study conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and 
funded by the National Institute on Aging. This survey provides a comprehensive set of variables 
including the demographics, health, income, wealth, and pensions of American elderly. The survey 
starts in 1992 and interviews 22,000 Americans aged 50 or older. RAND provides an easy-to-use 
version of the HRS, which combines all the waves from 1992 to 2010 and calculates imputations 
for income, assets, and medical expenditures from the original survey data. Based on when the 
respondent was born, the HRS further divides the respondents into different cohorts. The largest 
cohort is the HRS cohort, who were born between 1931 and 1941. Other cohorts include the 
AHEAD, who were born before 1924; Children of Depression (CODA), born between 1924 and 
1930; War Babies (WBs), born from 1942 to 1947; and Early Baby Boomers (EBBs), born 
between 1948 and 1953. In this study, I use data from all of the cohorts. 
[Insert Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 here] 
 Since the model intends to explain the saving and investment decisions of retirees, I restrict 
the sample to retired households only. For married couples, retirement status means that both 
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husband and wife are retired. Table 3-2 provides summary statistics for some key variables for 
retirees. Health expense E, which includes all private insurance premiums and all out-of-pocket 
medical expenses, has a mean value of $2,707, and its standard deviation is $8,350, implying that 
a large variation in health expense exists among retirees.  Table 3-3 provides more detailed 
summary statistics for the medical expenses for different cohorts across years.  For Social Security 
and pension income, the mean value is $24,314. Financial net worth, which is the sum of the dollar 
amounts in checking accounts, saving accounts, CDs, money market accounts, bonds, stocks, and 
mutual funds, has a mean value of $129,970. Total net worth is the difference between total assets 
and total liability and has a mean value of $370,754. Since this study focuses on the portfolio 
choice problem, financial wealth is a more relevant wealth measure as the allocation is made from 
financial wealth, not total household wealth, which includes non-liquid assets. 
[Insert Table 3-4 here] 
 As discussed in Section 3.2, I use Social Security and pension income P as a proxy for 
permanent income after retirement. Table 3-4 provides a more detailed description of this variable 
for different cohorts across years. The numbers show that income is relatively stable across years 
after adjusting for inflation, which is consistent with the assumption that permanent income does 
not grow or decline significantly for retirees. Therefore, permanent income can be used to 
normalize wealth, and normalized cash-at-hand is the key state variable for this model. The health 
expense ratio is calculated as the ratio of annual health expenditure E to permanent income P. As 
discussed above, retirees have a relatively constant stream of Social Security/pension income each 
year. Health shocks, however, are more stochastic, and health expenditures are often unavoidable. 
This expense can be seen as a reduction in the retiree’s income, which is similar to a negative 
  
81 
 
transitory shock to the usual labor income process. To determine the distribution of this shock’s 
magnitude, I calculate the ratio for each household annually. 
[Insert Table 3-5 here] 
 Table 3-5 provides summary statistics for the medical expense ratio. The mean annual 
health expenditure to permanent income ratio is 17.7% for the overall sample, with a median of 
5.4% and a standard deviation of 89.3%. As health expenditures are closely related to health status, 
I further classify the whole sample into two subsamples by respondents’ health status. HRS has a 
self-reported health status variable, ranking from 1 to 5, with 1 as excellent health and 5 as poor 
health.  If a retiree said his health is excellent, very good, or good, the health status is set to be 
good, and if a retiree said his health is fair or poor, the health status is set to be poor. I then 
calculated the health expenditure ratio for these two groups separately. As shown in Table 3-5, the 
good health group has a mean health expenditure ratio of 13.2%, whereas the poor health group’s 
ratio is 23.8%, substantially higher than that of the good health group.   
 In addition to health status, another factor that can significantly affect the medical expense 
ratio is age. Older people, especially those who are at the end of their life-span, can have large 
medical expenses which are not covered by Medicare or private health insurance. An example is 
long-term care expenses, which are not typically covered in standard insurance programs. To 
assess the age effect, I divide the whole sample into two groups: those between 65 and 85 years 
old and those who are older than 85. The younger group has an average 15.8% medical expense 
ratio, while the older group has an average ratio of 31.2%. If we further divide the age group into 
different health categories, substantial heterogeneity exists among different groups. The healthy 
younger retirees have an average ratio of 11.8%, whereas for the older group with poor health, the 
average health expenditure to income ratio climbs to 40%.  
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[Insert Figure 3-1 here] 
 Figure 3-1 shows the empirical frequency distribution of the medical expense ratio for the 
overall sample, and I fit it to a lognormal distribution with mean equal to -2.8 and a standard 
deviation of 1.4. The parameters of the fitted distribution will be used as inputs for the model 
calibration to characterize the shocks to the retirees’ income. The results in the next section are 
based on the assumption that all retirees face the same health shock distribution. In an extension 
section of this study, I calibrate the health expenditure ratio and solve the model for the good health 
and poor health groups separately, and the results are presented in Section 3.5. 
3.3.2 Problem with health ratio calibration  
 Among the several known distributions, log-normal distribution best fits the health 
expenditure ratio. However, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test still rejects the hypothesis that the 
health expenditure ratio comes from a log-normal distribution. One reason is that the parameters 
specified in the KS test are estimated from the actual data, which violates the assumption that the 
parameters should be pre-specified and should not come from the data. In a robust check, I apply 
the Monte-Carlo simulation to find the expected value of the value function. In the simulation, I 
do not calibrate the health expenditure ratio to any parametric distribution. Instead, I randomly 
draw 500 samples from the empirical distribution of the health expenditure ratio and incorporate 
them in the numerical analysis. This method does not rely on any parameterization assumption, 
but can reasonably capture the distributional property of health shock. The simulation analysis 
generates results similar to those obtained when the health expenditure ratio is calibrated to the 
log-normal distribution. 
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3.4 Optimal Policy Rules  
 Using the parameter value discussed in Section 3.3, I solve the model numerically to obtain 
the optimal consumption and portfolio choice rules. This section presents the optimal rules under 
different scenarios. As a benchmark analysis, Section 3.4.1 discusses retirees’ optimal policy rules 
when there is no health risk. In this case, retirees do not have any health shock to their Social 
Security/pension income, but they are still subject to financial crisis risk. Section 3.4.2 adds health 
risk to retirees’ income, which is the main feature of this model. Section 3.4.2.1 presents a case 
where I only consider the health risk but do not account for the financial crisis risk. Finally, Section 
3.4.2.2 discusses the results of the full model where both health risk and financial crisis risk are 
considered.  
3.4.1 Policy rules without health risk  
[Insert Figure 3-4 here] 
 Figure 3-4 (a) shows the results of the portfolio choice when there is no health shock to the 
income. In this case, the optimal share invested in risky assets decreases as normalized wealth rises. 
Retirees with higher (normalized) wealth level have a lower share of their financial wealth invested 
in risky assets. This result is consistent with the implications of the study by Cocco et al. (2005). 
The reason for the result is that if labor income does not have any risk after retirement, it is 
equivalent to risk-free assets. Therefore, retirees’ total wealth can be seen as a combination of 
financial wealth and human capital wealth (the discounted value of all future Social Security and 
pension income). For retirees with lower normalized financial wealth, the proportion of risk-free 
human capital out of total wealth is higher than it is for retirees with a large amount of financial 
wealth. It is the relative weight of risk-free assets as a portion of one’s total wealth that determines 
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how much risky assets one should hold. Retirees with lower normalized financial wealth have a 
higher proportion of risk-free assets (discounted future Social Security/pension income) in their 
wealth holding; therefore, they will invest more aggressively in stocks. The optimal share invested 
in stocks also decreases with age, except for the case when the normalized wealth is smaller than 
4. As the retiree ages, he will reduce his optimal risky asset holdings. 
[Insert Figure 3-8 here] 
 To provide a better illustration of the optimal portfolio choice, Figure 3-8 (a) presents the 
two-dimensional graph for retirees’ behavior for each level of normalized wealth at different ages. 
For retirees who are older than 65, the share invested in stocks monotonically decreases as 
normalized wealth increases, and with a given level of normalized wealth, older retirees will have 
a lower share invested in risky assets.  
 Financial crisis risk makes investing in stocks riskier. Compared with the case without any 
financial crisis (results not shown here)4, the difference is that at each level of normalized wealth, 
the optimal share invested in stocks is lower if we consider a financial crisis. The lower level of 
stock investment is consistent with the empirical observations found in the HRS. However, the 
result predicted by this case implies that as normalized wealth decreases, optimal share in stocks 
should increase, which is not consistent with the fact that wealthy investors generally have a higher 
portfolio share in stocks than do poor investors (Wachter, 2010). In the HRS, the 75 percentile 
value of the normalized financial wealth is 5.87; a more accurate model should be able to generate 
the optimal policy rule for the majority of retirees (i.e., those who have a normalized wealth ratio 
below 6). The baseline model’s failure can be attributed to its failure to take health risk into account. 
                                                 
4 Results available upon request.  
  
85 
 
Though retirees receive a fixed amount of income after retirement, due to health risks and the 
nature of health expenditures, the effective income of the retiree is not without risk. In the next 
section, I incorporate health shocks into the model and analyze how health shock affects retirees’ 
optimal behavior.  
3.4.2 Policy rules with health shock 
 In this section, health shocks are added to retirees’ income. The average value of their 
health expenditure is 17% of their income. The health shock is assumed to be i.i.d for each period. 
First, I examine the case when there is no financial crisis.  
3.4.2.1 Without Financial Crisis 
[Insert Figure 3-4, Figure 3-9 and Table 3-6 here] 
 Figure 3-4 (b) shows the portfolio rule when income is subjected to a health shock but there 
is no financial crisis. The results show that the portfolio share is lower when normalized wealth is 
low and gradually increases as normalized wealth increases and then decreases when normalized 
wealth increases further; the implication of this model can partly explain the phenomenon that the 
portfolio share increases with wealth as shown in Table 3-6.  
 Figure 3-9 presents a 2-dimensional graph for retirees at each normalized wealth level at 
different ages. The pattern is not very clear when the normalized wealth is below 1. However, 
when the normalized wealth is above 1, the portfolio share increases with normalized wealth for 
all age groups (except for the 94-year-old case) and gradually declines after normalized wealth 
reaches 4.5. This result is more aligned with the actual observations. However, one drawback of 
this model is that the optimal portfolio share is much higher than that shown by the actual 
observations, especially for people who have recently retired, for whom it increases from 20% to 
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90% when normalized wealth reaches 4 and stays above 50% when normalized wealth level further 
increases. And for those who are 75 years old, the optimal share also increases to a significantly 
high level of 75% when normalized wealth is around 5, which is not consistent with what we 
observe in the real data. The substantially high level of risky asset share can be attributed to the 
fact that financial crisis risk is not accounted for.  
3.4.2.2 With financial crisis  
[Insert Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-10 here] 
 This section presents the results of the full model where both health risk and financial crisis 
risk are considered. From Figure 3-5(a) we see that the optimal portfolio share drops slightly when 
normalized wealth is low and gradually increases as normalized wealth increases. Figure 3-10 (a) 
shows a more detailed portrait for retirees at each normalized wealth level at different ages. We 
can see that for all age groups (except at 94 years old), the portfolio share in stocks gradually 
increases as normalized wealth approaches 4.5 and then declines slowly until leveling out when 
normalized wealth is higher than 15. When these results are compared with the empirical data, it 
is clear that this model better captures the dynamics of stock investment, especially when 
normalized wealth is in the range of 1 to 6, where the normalized wealth of 75% of retirees falls. 
The magnitude of the risky asset share is also captured reasonably well. For example, for the 65 
age group, the portfolio share increases from 20% to around 45% and remains at 30% as 
normalized wealth further increases. For the 75 age group, the portfolio share increases to 35% 
when the normalized wealth level is 3 and stays at a relatively constant level of 20% when the 
normalized wealth level is higher than 9.  
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 Despite the better prediction generated by this model for the majority of retirees, it fails to 
explain the behavior of retirees whose normalized wealth is very high (i.e., those in the highest 
decile of the normalized wealth distribution) as shown in Table 3-6, where the mean risky asset 
holding increases with the mean normalized wealth ratio. In addition, the optimal behavior 
predicted by this model underestimates the risky asset share observed in the HRS, which is about 
50% for those whose normalized wealth level is above 30. One possible explanation is that in this 
model, every retiree is assumed to face the same financial crisis risk. However, it is possible that 
very wealthy retirees (as measured by high normalized financial wealth ratio) may be more risk 
tolerant and have better risk management skills, and more knowledge about financial market that 
would enable them to mitigate the detrimental effects of the financial crisis, so their behavior 
shows a closer resemblance to that predicted by the no financial crisis scenario as shown in Figure 
3-9 (a).  
3.5 Extension: Heterogeneous Health Risk 
 In the previous discussion, I assume all retirees have the same health shock risk. However, 
as shown in Section 3.3, the health expenditure ratio can differ substantially between the good 
health group and the poor health group. This section examines how different health status affects 
retirees’ optimal portfolio choice. Figure 3-3 presents the empirical distribution as well as the fitted 
distribution of the health expenditure ratio for the good health group versus the poor health group. 
Each group is fitted to a lognormal distribution; for the good health group,   = -3.0 best captures 
the features of the data, while for the poor health group,   = -2.5 fits better. Using these parametric 
values, I solve the model for the good health group and the poor health group separately.  
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[Insert Figure 3-11 to Figure 3-13 here] 
 Figure 3-11 to Figure 3-13 compare the portfolio choices for the good health and poor 
health groups at different ages. We see that the good health group consistently holds more stocks 
than the poor health group, with or without a financial crisis. The result is consistent with the 
empirical observation from the HRS and also with the results found in previous studies (Rosen, 
2004; Edwards, 2008) that investors’ poor health reduces their risky asset holdings.   
3.6 Simulation Results 
[Insert Figure 3-14 to Figure 3-16 here] 
 To assess the distributional properties of consumption and the risky asset share, I simulate 
the consumption and investment profiles of 5,000 retirees using the policy function obtained in 
Section 3.4. The retirees’ initial normalized wealth is drawn from the empirical distribution of the 
normalized wealth calculated from the HRS. Figure 3-14 presents the histogram of this empirical 
distribution. The frequency distribution of normalized wealth shows that the majority of retirees 
in the HRS have a normalized financial wealth ratio below 10.  
 I first simulate the case discussed in Section 3.4.1 where there is no health shock to retirees’ 
income. Figure 3-15 presents the mean and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the cross-sectional 
distribution of risky asset share. Figure 3-16 displays the results when financial crisis risk is present. 
The mean of the simulated risky asset share is close to 100% until the end of life. The simulation 
results do not match the empirical mean risky share shown in Table 3-7, where the mean risky 
share is about 25% after retirement. This result is also higher than the results in Kolusheva (2011); 
where her model implies that the mean risky asset share is about 50% after retirement with 
disastrous stock market risk. Despite being lower than the results shown here, Kolusheva’s results 
  
89 
 
are still too high to match the empirical distribution of the risky asset share. Failure to consider 
health risk can be a major factor leading to the prediction of this unrealistically high portfolio share.  
  I then simulate the case where there is health shock to the retirees’ income. Figure 3-16 
presents the mean and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of the 
simulated risky asset share. Part (a) of Figure 3-16 presents the results when there is no financial 
crisis risk, and Part (b) shows the results when the financial crisis risk is considered. After the 
addition of health risk, the model better explains the actual risky asset holding behavior of retirees. 
From the simulation results, we can see that the mean risky share decreases after the age of 75. 
However, if we consider only health risk but not the financial crisis risk, the mean risky asset share 
is 60% for retirees in their 70s, which is still too high when compared with the empirical findings. 
After both risks are added to the simulation, the mean optimal risky share decreases to 30% for 
retirees at 75 years old, and it decreases further when retirees get older, results which are very 
close to the actual holding level found in the Health and Retirement Survey. Though retirees start 
with different levels of normalized wealth and there is more variation in investing risky assets 
when retirees first retire, the heterogeneity in the risky asset share decreases as retirees approach 
very old age.  We can see the 5th percentile, the mean, and the 95th percentile gradually converge 
as retirees approach very old age.  
3.7 Conclusion  
 Most life cycle literature assumes retirees’ income is not subject to the income shocks that 
occur during the working life. The lack of income shocks during the retirement stage predicts that 
households will hold a slightly higher share in risky assets after retirement (Cocco et al., 2005). 
However, empirical studies have found that investment in stocks normally drops after retirement. 
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This paper extends the life cycle model by incorporating health risk and financial crisis risk into 
the analysis of retirees’ optimization problem. By modeling health risk as a stochastic shock to  
retirees’ income and adding financial crisis to the retirees’ optimization problem, this model 
generates policy functions that can better explain the observed investment behaviors of retirees.  
 For relatively young retirees with normalized wealth levels between 1.5 and 4.5, the 
optimal share invested in the risky assets increases as normalized wealth rises, and declines as 
normalized wealth increases beyond 4.5. For older retirees, i.e., those who are over 85 years old, 
the optimal share in risky assets remains rather flat and does not rise or decline when the 
normalized wealth level is higher than 3. In addition, the optimal policy rules derived from the 
model imply that retirees with good health status should hold a higher level of risky assets 
compared to retirees whose health status is poor. This result is consistent with the findings of 
several empirical studies (Rosen, 2004; Edwards, 2008) that poor health can reduce a household’s 
investment in risky assets.  
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Table 3-1: Benchmark parameter values 
This table presents the benchmark parameters for the model. Preference parameters and financial market parameters 
are obtained from Cocco et al. (2005), and health expenditure parameters are calibrated to the data from the Health 
and Retirement Survey.   
 
Description  Parameter Value  
  
Preference Parameters:  
Retirement age ( K )  65 
Discount factor ( ) 0.96 
Risk aversion ( ) 7 
  
Health Expenditure Parameters:  
Mean of )log (
Health Expenditure
Income
 (𝜇ℎ) -2.5 
Standard Deviation of )log (
Health Expenditure
Income
 (𝜎ℎ) 
1.2 
  
Financial Market Parameters:  
Riskless rate (
fr ) 0.02 
Mean of stock return (  ) 0.06 
Standard Deviation of Stock return (𝜎𝜂) 0.157 
Crash Probability (𝜋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ) 0.08 
Return when market crashes (𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ) -0.20 
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Table 3-2: Summary statistics for variables of interest in the HRS 
This table presents summary statistics for key variables of the Health and Retirement Survey from 1992 to 2010. 
Values are in 2010 dollars, adjusted using CPI data from the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis.   
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation N 
Age 73.11 73.00 9.36 59043 
 
Education 12.08 12.00 3.21 59017 
 
Health Expenditure 3046.08 1265.59 9213.04 59044 
 
Pension/Social Security Income 26803.64 19987.63 255303.71 59044 
 
Total Income 42062.61 27492.00 263385.69 59044 
 
Stock 75903.71 0 439745.68 59044 
     
Financial Net Worth 210203.11 34116.45 710615.72 59044 
 
Net Home Equity 127011.97 80843.50 267053.19 59044 
 
Net Worth 
(Excluding Primary Residence)  
 
293861.83 62967.56 878640.35 59044 
Total Net Worth 293861.83 62967.56 878640.35 59044 
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Table 3-3: Summary statistics for health expenditure  
This table presents summary statistics for annual health expenditure for different cohorts of the Health and 
Retirement Survey from 1992 to 2010. AHEAD were born 1923 or earlier; CODA (Children of Depression) were 
born from 1924 from 1930; HRS were born 1931-1941; WBs (War Babies) were born from 1942 to 1947; EBBs 
(Early Boomers) were born from 1948 to 1953; MBB (Mid Boomers) were born from 1954 to 1959. All dollar 
amounts are in 2010 dollars using CPI data from the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis.  
 
 1992 1996 2000 2006 2012 
COHORT      
      
AHEAD      
Mean 2251 2776 2731 4040 4151 
Median 1220 1043 1146 1298 1046 
Std Dev 3119 6156 5985 9585 9631 
N  21 1638 2212 1737 889 
      
HRS      
Mean 2069 2661 2256 2782 2674 
Median 945 1210 1228 1558 1352 
Std Dev 4466 4955 3971 17,609 5571 
N 514 1253 1963 3608 4396 
      
CODA      
Mean  - - 2049 3586 3038 
Median - - 1140 1558 1226 
Std Dev - - 3364 9129 7100 
N - - 961 1048 857 
      
War Babies      
Mean  - - 1465 3225 2879 
Median - - 430 1525 1562 
Std Dev - - 1892 4867 5077 
N - - 53 227 683 
      
Early Baby Boomers       
Mean - - - 2781 2081 
Median - - - 773 956 
Std Dev - - - 7058 3048 
N - - - 45 348 
      
Mid Baby Boomers       
Mean  - - - - 1501 
Median - - - - 401 
Std Dev - - - - 2987 
N - - - - 93 
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Table 3-4: Social Security and pension income  
This table presents summary statistics for Social Security & Pension income for different cohorts of the Health and 
Retirement Survey from 1992 to 2010. AHEAD were born 1923 or earlier; CODA (Children of Depression) were 
born from 1924 from 1930; HRS were born 1931-1941; WBs (War Babies) were born from 1942 to 1947; EBBs 
(Early Boomers) were born from 1948 to 1953; MBBs (Mid Boomers) were born from 1954 to 1959. All dollar 
amounts are in 2010 dollars using CPI data from the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis.  
 
 
COHORT 1992 1996 2000 2006 2012 
      
AHEAD      
Mean 22304 25711 24819 22863 20922 
Median 21443 21807 20309 18302 15750 
Std Dev 7921 19000 23475 17317 26580 
N  21 1638 2212 1737 889 
      
HRS      
Mean 24501 28704 30067 31186 24016 
Median 18656 23367 24295 24716 20401 
Std Dev 19716 28512 23338 35205 18410 
N 514 1253 1963 3608 4396 
      
CODA      
Mean  - - 29066 29187 25220 
Median - - 23553 22826 20270 
Std Dev - - 21580 23850 20227 
N - - 961 1048 857 
      
War Babies      
Mean  - - 24390 26291 24937 
Median - - 17597 18173 20924 
Std Dev - - 18641 27233 18374 
N - - 53 227 683 
      
Early Baby Boomers       
Mean - - - 21430 20718 
Median - - - 14927 13840 
Std Dev - - - 16709 20040 
N - - - 45 180 
      
Mid Baby Boomers       
Mean  - - - - 13093 
Median - - - - 8322 
Std Dev - - - - 12743 
N - - - - 93 
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Table 3-5: Summary statistics for medical expense ratio  
This table presents the summary statistics for the medical expense ratio for the overall sample and for subsamples 
based on health status and age from the Health and Retirement Survey.  
 
Sample  Mean Median St Dev N 
     
Overall Sample: 0.175 0.055 0.577 54342 
     
   By Health Status:      
        Excellent/Good 0.135 0.044 0.505 23109 
        Fair/Poor  0.230 0.076 0.658 31233 
     
Subsample A: 65<=Age<=85 
 0.163 0.054 0.543 48407 
  By Health Status:     
       Excellent/Good:  0.125 0.043 0.472 27995 
       Fair/Poor: 0.215 0.075 0.624 20412 
     
Subsample B: Age>85 
 0.274 0.065 0.794 5935 
 By Health Status:     
      Excellent/Good: 0.217 0.053 0.722 3238 
      Fair/Poor:  0.343 0.084 0.867 2697 
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Table 3-6: Mean portfolio share in stock 
This table divides the retirees into 10 decile groups based on the normalized wealth level. Panel A presents the mean 
portfolio share for different normalized wealth deciles of the overall sample; Panel B presents the mean portfolio 
share for different normalized wealth deciles by age; Panel C presents the mean portfolio share for different wealth 
deciles by health status.  
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean WRatio 0.030 0.132 0.351 0.736 1.372 2.371 3.897 6.386 11.574 31.391 
           
Panel A: Mean Stock Holding Ratio 
All Sample: 0.021 0.035 0.066 0.114 0.166 0.220 0.272 0.345 0.399 0.496 
 
Panel B: By Age Group: 
60<=Age<70 0.033 0.047 0.069 0.152 0.184 0.276 0.290 0.380 0.422 0.498 
70<=Age<80 0.014 0.033 0.067 0.115 0.181 0.214 0.275 0.351 0.421 0.506 
80<=Age<90 0.022 0.035 0.063 0.092 0.124 0.192 0.254 0.323 0.365 0.488 
Age>=90 0.021 0.009 0.052 0.062 0.103 0.144 0.257 0.271 0.340 0.453 
           
Panel C: By Health Status: 
Excellent/Good 0.018 0.040 0.071 0.121 0.188 0.237 0.286 0.361 0.412 0.508 
Fair/Poor  0.023 0.030 0.058 0.105 0.131 0.191 0.244 0.314 0.356 0.468 
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Table 3-7: Portfolio share for different cohorts by age 
This table presents the mean portfolio share for different age by cohorts. The HRS cohort members were born between 1931 and 1941. The Children of 
Depression (CODA), were born between 1924 and 1930; The AHEAD cohort members were born before1924. 
 
Age: 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 
                
Cohort:                
 
HRS: 
 
0.240 
 
0.235 
 
0.211 
 
0.202 
 
0.178 
 
0.169 
 
0.176 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
CODA: - - 0.216 0.215 0.205 0.225 0.204 0.199 0.204 - - - - - - 
 
AHEAD1: - - 0.217 0.243 0.251 0.252 0.260 0.209 0.222 0.191 - - - - - 
 
AHEAD2: - - - - 0.222 0.249 0.246 0.218 0.225 0.229 0.214 0.192 - - - 
 
AHEAD3: - - - - - - - 0.189 0.235 0.232 0.233 0.252 0.202 0.193 0.199 
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Figure 3-1: Medical expense ratio  
This figure displays the histogram of the empirical medical expense ratio and the fitted lognormal distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
99 
 
Figure 3-2: Medical expense by age group  
This figure displays the histogram of the medical expense ratio and the fitted lognormal distribution for the younger 
age group and older age group, respectively. 
(a) Age Group 1: 65<=Age <=85 
(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
(d)  
(e)  
(f)  
(g)  
(h)  
 
 
(b) Age Group 2: Age >=85 
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Figure 3-3: Medical expense ratio by health status 
 
This figure displays the histogram of the medical expense ratio and the fitted lognormal distribution for the 
excellent/good health group and the fair/poor health group, respectively.  
 
     (a) Excellent/Good Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Fair /Poor Health  
 
 
 
 
     (b) Poor/Fair Health 
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Figure 3-4: The portfolio rule for two cases 
The surface plot in panel (a) displays the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks at different 
normalized wealth levels and ages when there is financial crisis risk but no health risk. The surface plot in panel (b) 
displays the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks at different normalized wealth level and age 
when there is health risk but no financial crisis risk. 
 
(a) Without health risk but with financial crisis risk 
 
 
    (b) With health risk but without financial crisis risk 
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Figure 3-5: Policy function with health risk and financial crisis 
The surface plots display the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks and the consumption rule at 
different normalized wealth levels and ages when there are both health risk and financial crisis risk.  
 
(a) The portfolio rule under both health risk and financial crisis risk  
 
 
 
 
(b) The consumption rule under both health risk and financial crisis risk 
 
 
  
  
103 
 
Figure 3-6: The portfolio rule for the good health group 
The surface plots display the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks at different ages for the good 
health group (a) without considering financial crisis, and (b) considering financial crisis, respectively.  
 
(a) Portfolio Rule for good health group (without financial crisis risk) 
 
(b) The portfolio rule for the good health group (with financial crisis risk) 
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Figure 3-7: The portfolio rule for the poor health group 
The surface plots display the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks at different ages for the poor 
health group (a) without considering financial crisis, and (b) considering financial crisis, respectively. 
 
(a) The portfolio rule for the poor health group (without financial crisis risk)  
 
 
(b) The portfolio rule for the poor health group (with financial crisis risk)  
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Figure 3-8: Policy functions for retirees at different ages (without health risk but with financial crisis risk)   
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks (a) and the saving rule (b) at different 
ages when there is financial crisis risk but no health risk.  
 
(a) The portfolio rule for retirees at different ages (perfect income, no health risk) 
 
 
 
(b)  The saving rule for retirees at different ages (perfect income, no health risk) 
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Figure 3-9: Policy functions for retirees at different age (with health risk but without financial crisis risk)   
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks (a) and the saving rule (b) at different 
ages when there is health risk but no financial crisis risk. 
 
(a)  The portfolio rule for retirees at different ages (with health shocks)  
 
(b) The saving rule for retirees at different ages  (with health shocks)  
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Figure 3-10: Policy functions for retirees at different ages (with health risk and financial crisis risk)   
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks (a) and the saving rule (b) at different 
ages when there are both health risk and financial crisis risk. 
 
(a)  The portfolio rule for retirees at different ages (with health and financial crisis risk)  
 
 
 
(b)  The saving rule for retirees at different ages (with health and financial crisis risk) 
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Figure 3-11: The portfolio rule at age 65 by health status 
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks for the good health group vs. the poor 
health group at age of 65; part (a) plots the no financial crisis case and part (b) plots the financial crisis case.  
 
(a) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 65 (without financial crisis risk) 
 
 
 
(b) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 65 (with financial crisis risk) 
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Figure 3-12: The portfolio rule at age 75 by health status 
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks for the good health group vs. the poor 
health group at age of 75; part (a) plots the no financial crisis case and part (b) plots the financial crisis case. 
 
(a) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 75 (without financial crisis risk) 
 
 
 
(b) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 75 (with financial crisis risk) 
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Figure 3-13: The portfolio rule at age 85 by health status 
This graph plots the policy functions for the portfolio share invested in stocks for the good health group vs. the poor 
health group at age of 85; part (a) plots the no financial crisis case and part (b) plots the financial crisis case. 
 
(a) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 85 (without financial crisis risk) 
 
 
 
 
(b) The portfolio rule for good health vs. poor health at 85 (with financial crisis risk) 
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Figure 3-14: Initial wealth distribution for retirees 
This figure presents the empirical distribution of the normalized wealth ratio obtained from the Health and Retirement 
Survey. The normalized wealth ratio is calculated by dividing total household financial wealth by pension/Social 
Security income.  
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Figure 3-15: Simulation results: Without health risk 
 
This figure plots the mean, 5th, and 95th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of the simulated portfolio share 
in risky assets when there is financial crisis risk but no health risk. 
 
 
Simulated portfolio share (with financial crisis risk but no health risk) 
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Figure 3-16: Simulation results: With health risk 
This figure plots the mean, 5th, and 95th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of the simulated portfolio share 
in risky assets when there is health risk and (a) no financial crisis risk and (b) financial crisis risk.  
 
(a)  Simulated portfolio share (with health risk but no financial crisis risk) 
 
(b) Simulated portfolio share (with both health risk and financial crisis risk) 
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Impacts of Financial Crisis on Income Inequality: 
A Decomposed Approach 
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Chapter 4 
Impacts of Financial Crisis on Income Inequality: 
A Decomposed Approach 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 Income inequality has been rising steadily over the last 40 years in the United States. 
Among the papers written on the subject, many focus on the long run trends in income distribution, 
which are more closely related to economic development and productivity change. However, 
shocks to the economy, especially those like the 2008 financial crisis, have a major impact on the 
production and allocation of economic resources, and can potentially cause a substantial change 
to the income distribution of households. This paper provides a quantitative measure of how 
income distribution changed following the crisis. To gain a more complete picture of the change 
in the income distribution, I analyze the Lorenz curve and its associated concentration curve 
instead of choosing a single inequality measure, such as the Gini coefficient. The use of the Lorenz 
curve provides us with a means to decompose the overall population income distribution by 
subgroups and allows us to capture how different subgroups, defined by race, gender, or other 
household characteristics, contributed to overall income inequality before and after the financial 
crisis.  
 This study is closely related to three strands of research: work on how major economic 
shocks, particularly financial crisis, affect income distribution in the economy; work on top income 
share change in the United States; and work on the application of non-parametric approaches to 
decompose income inequality by subgroups. Two approaches have been used in empirical studies 
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to assess the impacts of economic crises on income level and income distribution. One approach 
uses economic models to calibrate household behaviors to the real economy and uses 
microsimulation analysis to measure the impact of the shocks (Robilliard et al., 2001; Habib et al., 
2010). This approach is often used when real time economic data are not available during the crisis, 
but immediate analysis is needed to make important policy assessments. The other approach 
utilizes available income data to conduct a descriptive study of the impact of the crisis. The results 
obtained using this approach have been inconclusive; some studies have found that financial crisis 
has a lasting effect on income distribution (Cerra and Saxena, 2008), while other studies have 
found that the effect of crisis on income distribution is temporary and that income distribution 
reverts back to its previous state in the longer term (Faik, 2012; Morelli,2014).  
 In addition to the study of changes in overall income distribution, examination of the 
change in top income shares also plays an important role in income inequality analysis. Top income 
shares indicate how much total income is earned by people in the top tail of the income distribution, 
such as the top 1%, the top 5%, and the top 10% of the income distribution. In the United States, 
households in the top 10% of the income distribution earned 47% of the total earnings in 2007. 
Financial crisis can have a large impact on the income of the top earners as many wealthy 
households hold a substantial amount of stocks. A large drop in capital income caused by the 
financial crisis can severely reduce their income. By analyzing the ordinates of the Lorenz curve 
and its associated concentration curve, I am able to assess the top earners’ income share before 
and after the crisis and to examine how the crisis changed their income share.  
 Furthermore, in analyzing how the financial crisis affects income distribution by subgroups, 
I adopt the decomposition methodology proposed in Bishop et al. (1993, 2004). As compared to 
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other decomposition studies (Shorrocks,1984; Deutsch and Silber 1999),  the application of Bishop 
et al.’s (2004) methodology allowed me to track the subgroup changes for the whole income 
distribution, instead of just the change in a single index. The SCF 2007-2009 panel dataset provides 
detailed household income data as well as demographic variables, which are ideal for constructing 
a decomposed Lorenz curve and its associated concentration curve.  
 The analysis yielded three key findings. First, I find that the overall income distributions 
shifted from 2007 to 2009. Income shares for the bottom to 9th decile increased, and top earners, 
defined as households in the top 10% of the income distribution, had a lower income share after 
the crisis. Comparing Lorenz curves in 2007 and 2009, I find that the top 10% of households in 
the income distribution earned 47.2% in 2007, and their income share decreased to 42.3% in 2009. 
In particular, the decreases in the income share for the top earners was more pronounced in the 
concentration ordinates, which measure the income share changes for households ranked based on 
their pre-crisis income level. Households which were in the top 10% of the income distribution in 
2007 received only 37.7% of total income in 2009, a 5 percentage point reduction compared to the 
results implied by the 2009 Lorenz curve.  
 Second, I find that the decomposed concentration ordinates for subgroups, characterized 
by race, gender, and retirement status, followed a pattern similar to that found for the overall 
sample. The decomposed concentration ordinates for each of the subgroups rose from the bottom 
to the 9th decile and decreased substantially for the top decile group. However, the decomposed 
ordinates of the 2009 Lorenz curve showed a less uniform pattern:  not all subgroups’ decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates increased.  Non-white groups’ Lorenz ordinates fell from the 7th decile to the 9th 
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decile and rose for the top decile group in 2009. Female groups’ Lorenz ordinates decreased in all 
deciles, except for the 9th and the top decile.  
 Third, the additive decomposition based on race and retirement status did not change much 
from the 2007 Lorenz curve to the 2009 Lorenz curve.  With regard to subgroups based on gender, 
males’ contribution share increased in the bottom 6 deciles, whereas female groups’ contribution 
share decreased in those deciles.  
 The results are consistent with previous findings (Faik, 2012; Morelli, 2014) that overall 
income inequality dropped immediately after the crisis. In an extension study, I use the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) as a supplementary dataset to analyze longer-term effects of the 
financial crisis. For a comparison study, I also use the PSID to assess the impacts of the 1987 stock 
market crash on the income distribution to see how it differed from the 2008 financial crisis in 
terms of its impacts on household income distribution.  
 The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the relevant literature 
review. Section 4.3 describes the decomposition methodology of the Lorenz and concentration 
curves. Section 4.4 describes the data used for constructing the inequality measure and defines the 
income variable for my analysis. Section 4.5 analyzes the decomposition results based on race, 
gender, and retirement status. Section 4.6 extends the study using the PSID. Section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Inequality before and after the crisis  
 Literature on the effects of financial crises on income distribution falls mainly into two 
broad categories: the first one focuses on financial crises in the developing countries and their 
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impact on income distribution and poverty. These crises are often associated with rapid 
depreciation of the local currency, and have a detrimental effect on the local economy, such as 
happened in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. For example, Baldacci et al. (2002) focus on the 
effects of currency crashes, and they examine income changes in Mexico after the Peso’s crash in 
December 1994. They find that income inequality increases as the result of a more-than-
proportional fall in the income share of the lowest income quintile of the population. Robilliard et 
al. (2001) and Habib et al. (2010) use a microsimulation approach to examine the distributional 
effects of financial crises. They find that income shocks are relatively large in the middle parts of 
the income distribution. But such shocks will not automatically lead to higher inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient. Overall inequality worsens when the losses are 
disproportionately high among the poor. Only in Mexico, where a larger shock is projected at the 
lower end of the distribution, was there an increase in the aggregate inequality. 
 The second category of the literature focuses on income inequality in the U.S. and other 
OECD countries before and after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Several studies have provided 
descriptive analysis, and their results are mixed. De Beer (2012) finds that there is no uniform 
pattern in the impact of the crisis on earnings and income distribution among the EU countries. 
Faik (2012) uses data from the German Social-Economic Panel (SOEP) to study inequality and 
poverty before and during the economic crisis, and he finds that inequality dropped at the peak of 
the crisis but increased afterwards. 
4.2.2 Decomposing the inequality measure  
 Studies on income inequality usually use a single inequality measure, such as the Gini 
coefficient, to provide summary statistics for the overall income distribution. Despite its simplicity, 
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this measurement, because of its aggregate nature, fails to account for the sources of the inequality. 
To better understand how different subgroups contribute to the total income inequality, several 
studies have attempted to decompose the inequality measure. Deutsch and Silber (1999) analyze 
total inequality in the population as a consequence of the income difference between population 
subgroups, classified by characteristics such as age, gender, race, and education level. They focus 
on decomposing a single inequality index, and they consider the issue of inequality decomposition 
by population subgroups as an index number problem. Shorrocks (1984) uses income inequality 
measures from population subgroups to determine the aggregate inequality index. Bishop et al. 
(2011) look at the interdistributional inequality among population subgroups. My study differs 
from those in the previous literature in two major aspects. Previous studies have focused on 
decomposing a single inequality index, such as the Gini coefficient. My study, however, 
decomposes the whole Lorenz curve, and hence does not suffer from the index selection problem 
(Bishop et al. 2003). In addition, I use panel data from the Survey of Consumer Finance to 
construct a concentration curve, in which after-crisis earnings are arranged by the households’ 
positions in the pre-crisis income distributions. The concentration curve is a more accurate 
measure of the conditional change in the household income distribution.   
4.2.3 Use of household survey data  
 Household survey data, which often include detailed household financial information, can 
be useful in studying income distribution changes. Milanovic (2002) uses household surveys to  
conduct a cross-country analysis focusing on the Gini coefficient. Zietz and Zhao (2009) use the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study the effects of a stock price change on U.S. 
income inequality. Their study focuses on the short run effects, but instead of looking at a crisis, 
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they examine how stock market appreciation affects U.S. income inequality. Using a regression-
based method to calculate the Gini coefficient, they find that the stock market appreciation raised 
the Gini coefficient by about 2% in the 1980s and by 3% in the 1990s. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Decomposing the ordinates  
 Following the decomposition methodology in Bishop et al. (2003), let (𝑥, 𝑦) be a vector of 
continuous income variables, where 𝑥, 𝑦 are jointly distributed with a probability density function 
f (𝑥, 𝑦);  𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 represent the earnings of the same household in the pre-crisis year and the after-
crisis year, respectively. Using an indicator variable approach, each household is assigned a decile 
group using the binary indicator variable, 1xI   if x  and 0
xI   otherwise. The overall 
Lorenz ordinate and the concentration ordinate can be expressed as:         
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where x is the mean of  x and y  is the mean of y, 𝐿(𝜏, 𝑥) represents the proportion of total 
2007 income received by households whose income level is less than or equal to 𝜏 , 
𝐶(𝜏, 𝑦) represents the proportion of total 2009 income received by households whose 2007 income 
is less than or equal to 𝜏, and 𝜏 is the inverse CDF of the base year income: 𝜏 = 𝐹−1(𝑝).  
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 To decompose the overall Lorenz ordinates and concentration ordinates by subgroups, I 
create K mutually exclusive population groups: Φ𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾 and define an indicator variable 
x
kG  such that 
x
kG  = 1 if the household belongs to group k and 
x
kG  = 0, otherwise. I use 2007 pre-
crisis data to create the groups, and the group identification remains the same for constructing the 
decomposed 2009 concentration curve. Following Bishop et al. (2003), the decomposed Lorenz 
curve and concentration curve for group k can be expressed as:  
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where k=1,2,…K.  By the law of large numbers, (4-3) and (4-4) can be empirically estimated as 
the ratio of two sample means:  
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4.3.2 Additive decomposition  
 For a particular decile, Group k’s contribution to the overall Lorenz ordinate in that decile 
can be expressed as:  
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From (4-7), the additive decomposition can be calculated as the ratio of the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates to the overall Lorenz ordinates, multiplied by the income of group k, 𝑝𝑘. 
4.4 Data 
 In the main analysis, I use the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) published by the Federal 
Reserve. This triennial survey includes household demographics, income, and balance sheet 
information. I use the 2007 sample data, which were collected before the onset of the 2008 
financial crisis. In 2009, The Federal Reserve decided to do a panel5 study following the crisis and 
re-interviewed the same households surveyed in 2007 with similar questions6 to assess how their 
financial situations had changed after the crisis. The 2007 and 2009 waves of the SCF panel dataset 
included 3,862 families, and five observations were deleted from the public available dataset to 
                                                 
5 Federal Reserve samples a different set of households every three years. The 2009 panel is a rare exception. The 
only previous panel was done for the 1983-1989 wave.  
6 The 2009 survey added a set of attitudinal questions regarding the 2008 financial crisis and its consequences.  
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protect the privacy of the households. Because the SCF asks about sensitive financial data, some 
households are reluctant or unable to provide accurate answers. The Federal Reserve has 
developed a set of imputation techniques to correct for the missing data problem7. Each missing 
record is imputed 5 times, and there are a total 19,285 records in the public dataset. Following 
Calati et al. (2008) and Lee and Carlin (2010), I use the average of the five imputations as the 
observed value for a household.  
 The SCF adopts a dual-frame design in the data collection process. One subsample uses a 
multi-stage area-probability model to choose the households across the country, and it represents 
the characteristics of the general population in the United States. In addition to this sample, the 
SCF also samples households with high net worth, selected from the IRS tax return filings. 
Compared to other panel studies, the dual-frame design of the SCF provides more complete 
information on the households in the top decile of the income distribution, whose income can 
change substantially during a financial crisis. Neither subsample has an equal-probability design; 
therefore, weight is assigned to each observation, and this needs to be taken into consideration 
when an inference is made about the population.  
[Insert Table 4-1 here] 
 Table 4-1 provides summary statistics for some key variables in the SCF 2007-2009 panel 
dataset. The mean income dropped significantly, from $89,036 in 2007 to $80,816 in 2009. Median 
income also dropped slightly, from $49,841 to $49,810. For assets and net worth, both mean and 
median value dropped significantly after the crisis.  
                                                 
7 The imputation procedure is described in “Multiple Imputation in the Survey of Consumer Finances,” 
Arthur B. Kennickell, September 1998, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/method.html. 
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4.4.1 Income definition 
 Since the focus of this paper is on the effects of the financial crisis on the overall and 
subgroup income distributions, the definition of the income variable is important to the analysis. 
Following Piketty and Saez (2003, 2014), I use pre-tax gross income for the calculation, and this 
includes wage and salary income, business income, interest and dividend income, capital gain/loss 
income8, pension, social security, and income from transfer payments. To examine how changes 
occur in different demographic subgroups, I divide the whole sample into mutually exclusively 
population subsamples based on households’ characteristics. The variables used in the subgroup 
analysis are race, gender, and retirement status.  
[Insert Table 4-2 here] 
 Table 4-2 presents summary statistics for the income variable based on each group 
classification. As the SCF uses the household as the unit of observation, race, gender, and 
retirement status are based on the information about the household head. In the SCF, if a household 
does not include a couple, the head is taken to be the single core individual in that household. If a 
household has a central couple, the head is taken to be either the male in a mixed-sex couple or the 
older individual in a same-sex couple. The first two panels display income information based on 
race and gender. Panel A displays the results by race; I divide the whole sample into two racial 
categories: white and non-white. Both groups’ median income dropped after the crisis, but that of 
the white group dropped more, from $103,552 to $91,750. For the non-white group, median 
household income dropped from $58,211 to $57,490.  Panel B presents the results based on gender; 
                                                 
8 This is annual income from net gains or losses from mutual funds or from the sale of stocks, bonds, or real estate, 
before deductions for taxes. 
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773 observations in the SCF 2007-2009 panel dataset are for female households.  For the whole 
population, the percentage of female households is 27.4%, and they contribute 11.3% to the total 
income. Households with a female head have a significantly lower level of median income 
compared to households with a male head. However, the median income for a household with a 
female head did not drop after the crisis; on the contrary, it increased from $36,905 in 2007 to 
$38,987 in 2009.  
 Panel C presents the income information based on the household head’s retirement status. 
Retirement often marks a significant change in income source and level, and it is interesting to 
examine how the crisis affected retired households versus non-retired households. In the sample, 
677 observations had a retired household head; for the overall population, 18.8% of the households 
had a retired household head, and retired households earned 15% of the total income. The median 
income for both retired and non-retired households dropped after the crisis, and the degree of the 
drop was similar in both groups.  
4.5 Decomposition Results  
4.5.1 Overall decomposition results  
[Insert Table 4-6 here] 
 Table 4-6 provides the Lorenz ordinates for the overall sample. The first row in each panel 
presents the order statistics, which are the upper cutoff income levels of the overall sample for 
2007 and 2009, respectively. Each observation is weighted when the order statistics are calculated. 
For 2007, the order statistic for the bottom decile is 13,632, indicating that the bottom 10% of the 
total population had income less than $13,632. Comparing the order statistics before and after the 
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financial crisis, I find that the order statistics generally decreased, with the exception of the bottom 
decile, where the order statistic increased from $13,632 to $13,947.   
 The second row of each panel calculates the ordinates for the overall Lorenz curve at each 
decile level for 2007 and 2009, respectively. The standard error is given in parentheses. The Lorenz 
ordinate for the bottom decile is 0.0098 in 2007, indicating that the bottom 10% of the overall 
population received less than 1% of the total earnings in 2007. The Lorenz ordinate for the ninth 
decile is 0.5218, indicating that the bottom 90% of the overall population received 52.18% of the 
total income in 2007, and this implies that the top 10% of the population received 48% of the total 
income. The Lorenz ordinates uniformly drop after the crisis, and the decrease for the highest 
decile is the most significant. The bottom 90% of the population received 57.8% of the total income 
in 2009, a 5% increase from the 2007 level. Correspondingly, the top 10% of the population’s 
income share dropped from 48% to 43% from 2007 to 2009. It is not surprising to see that their 
income share dropped substantially, as capital gain income was significantly reduced due to the 
financial crisis. The effect is even more pronounced among the top 1% of income earners, who 
may have a large proportion of their income come from capital gain. This finding is consistent 
with Piketty and Saez (2012), where it is found that the income growth for the bottom 99% of 
earners was -11.6% during the 2007 to 2009 period, while for the top 1% of earners, the real 
income growth was -36.3%. The loss in earnings for the top 1% of earners was much more severe 
than it was for the rest of the population. In the next section, I decompose the overall Lorenz curve 
by race and examine how each group contributed to the overall Lorenz ordinates and how their 
contribution changed after the financial crisis.  
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4.5.2 Decomposition by race  
[Insert Table 4-7 to Table 4-9 here] 
 Table 4-7 to Table 4-9 present the ordinate decomposition by race. I divide the whole 
population into two subgroups, the white group and non-white group, and track the ordinate 
changes within these subgroups before and after the crisis. Table 4-7 shows the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates for 2007. The decomposed ordinates of the bottom decile of the white group is 0.0077, 
which means that only 0.77% of the total white group’s income was accrued to those in the bottom 
decile of the overall earning distribution. Similarly, the decomposed ordinates for the bottom decile 
of the non-white group is 0.023, which indicates that 2.3% of the non-white group’s income was 
received by those in the bottom 10% of the population. It is not surprising to see that the top decile 
earners were mostly in the white group, and more than half of the total white group income was 
received by workers in the top decile, while only about 25% of the non-white group income was 
earned by those in the top decile.  
 Panel B in Table 4-7 shows the additive decomposition results by subgroup. The 
contribution of the white group to the bottom decile was 53.4%, and the non-white group 
contributed 46.6%. The white group’s contribution share increased for each subsequent decile. For 
the 9th decile, the white group contributed 70.7% to the overall Lorenz ordinates in that decile, 
while the remaining 29% was contributed by the non-white group.  
 Table 4-8 presents the decomposed Lorenz ordinates and the additive decomposition for 
the 2009 data. Though the overall Lorenz ordinates increased after the crisis, the decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates for the two subgroups exhibited different patterns: the white group’s decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates increased for each decile, while the non-white group’s decomposed Lorenz 
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ordinates actually decreased for the 7th to the 9th deciles. For example, in 2007, 74.2% of the total 
non-white group’s income accrued to the bottom 90% of workers, while in 2009, 72.2% of total 
non-white income was earned by the bottom 90% of workers. In other words, the non-white 
households in the top 10% of the income distribution received 2 percent more of the income after 
the crisis, which implies that a crisis can have different impacts on the within-group income 
distribution. Despite the different patterns of changes in the decomposed Lorenz ordinates for the 
white vs. the non-white group, no significant change was found in the additive decomposition for 
these two subgroups.  
[Insert Table 4-9 here] 
 Table 4-9 Panel A presents the concentration ordinates for the subsample. Households who 
were in the bottom earning decile before the crisis received 0.98% of the total 2007 income, 
whereas the same group of households received 2.25% of the total 2009 income. The top 10% of 
households received 47.82% of 2007 income, but their income share dropped to 42.12% after the 
crisis. Both white and non-white decomposed concentration ordinates exhibited patterns similar to 
those of the overall ordinates. Measured by the income share of each decile, income inequality 
decreased in both groups. Panel B shows the additive decomposition result; the only significant 
change in the contribution share occurred in the bottom decile, where the white group’s 
contribution increased from 53.4% to 60.4%. For other deciles, no significant change was found 
in terms of percentage contributions.  
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[Insert Table 4-23 here] 
 To test the significance of the differences in the decomposed Lorenz ordinates between the 
white and the non-white group, I conduct a chi-square test. The null hypothesis is that there will 
be no difference in the Lorenz ordinates between the two subgroups. It can be defined as:  
 0 :H  0   
 where 𝛾 = (?̂?1
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒) − ?̂?1
(𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒), … , ?̂?9
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒) − ?̂?9
(𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒)) is a 1 9  vector of sample 
estimates of the differences between the decomposed white group’s Lorenz ordinates and the non-
white group’s Lorenz ordinates. Table 4-23 panel A and B provide the test results for the difference 
between the white and the non-white groups’ Lorenz ordinates in 2007 and 2009, respectively. 
The chi-square test results are statistically significant, indicating that differences exist between the 
subgroups. The magnitude of the chi-square test statistics increased from 32,602 in 2007 to 50,321 
in 2009, indicating that the white and the non-white groups become less alike after the crisis.  
 The chi-square test can also be used to test whether the subgroups’ ordinates are different 
across years. The null hypothesis can be specified as:  
𝐻0: 𝝍 = 𝟎 
 where 𝜓 = (?̂?1
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒) − ?̂?1
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒), … , ?̂?9
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒) − ?̂?9
(𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒)) is a 1 × 9 vector of sample estimates of 
the differences between the white group’s decomposed Lorenz ordinates and its concentration 
ordinates before and after the crisis. Panel C of Table 4-23 provides the chi-square statistics, and 
we can see that for both the white and the non-white group, the difference between the 
concentration ordinates and the Lorenz ordinates is significant, indicating that the financial crisis 
had an effect on the conditional change in the income share.  
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4.5.3 Decomposition by gender  
[Insert Table 4-10 to Table 4-12 here]  
 Table 4-10 shows the decomposed Lorenz ordinates for 2007. Female-headed households 
had a more equal distribution of income across deciles. For example, 48% of the female-headed 
households’ income accrued to those below the median income level, while for the male-headed 
households, only 10.5% of the income was received by those below the median income level. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 4-4, only 1.45% of female-headed households are in the top 10% of 
the overall income distribution, while 13.25% of male-headed households are in the top 10% of 
the overall income distribution. The decomposed Lorenz ordinates in the top decile reflect a similar 
pattern: 52.5% of all male-headed households’ earnings was earned by those in the top 10% decile, 
while only 11% of all female-headed households’ earnings was earned by those in the top 10% 
decile.  
 Panel B of Table 4-10 presents the additive decomposition results by subgroup based on 
gender. The contribution of the male group to the overall sample ordinates for the bottom decile 
was 38.2%, and the female group contributed the remaining 61.8%. The male group’s contribution 
share increased for each subsequent decile. For the 9th decile, the male group contributed 80.8% 
to the overall Lorenz ordinates, while the female group contributed only 11.3% to the Lorenz 
ordinates in the top decile. This is consistent with the findings in Table 4-3, where we can see that 
the female group accounts for a much smaller proportion in the top earning decile.  
 Table 4-11 presents the decomposed 2009 Lorenz curve, and Table 4-12 presents the 
decomposed 2009 concentration curve. For the male group, ordinates in each decile increased for 
both the Lorenz curve and concentration curve after the crisis, but the increases in the concentration 
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ordinates were more pronounced. For example, the decomposed Lorenz ordinates for the bottom 
decile was 0.0042 for the male group in 2007, and it increased to 0.0055 in 2009, whereas the 
increase in the decomposed concentration ordinates for the bottom decile of the male group was 
larger: 0.0132 in 2009. As discussed before, the concentration curve is a conditional Lorenz curve, 
and in it the decile cutoff point did not change from before to after the crisis. It was the same group 
of households in each decile, and only their income share changed. In 2007, only 0.42% of total 
male group income was earned by the male-headed households in the bottom decile of the 
population, this same group of male households earned 1.32% of the total male group income in 
2009. The male group’s income became more equally distributed, measured either by the 2009 
Lorenz ordinates or the concentration ordinates, but the conditional ordinates showed even more 
equality.  
 The change in the female group is interesting: the decomposed Lorenz ordinates, in which 
all households have been re-ordered according to their 2009 income level, decreased in each decile 
except the 9th. For example, the decomposed Lorenz ordinates of the female group in the bottom 
decile are 0.0541 in 2007 and 0.0481 in 2009. If only these two numbers were compared, we would 
conclude that the female-headed households in the bottom decile of the income distribution had 
received a smaller proportion (4.81%) of the female group’s income after the crisis. However, if 
we examine the decomposed ordinates of the concentration curve, which is 0.0842 for the female 
group in the bottom decile, we find that the female-headed households who were in the bottom 
decile of the 2007 income distribution received 8.42% of the entire female group’s income in 2009. 
This different pattern indicates that some female-headed households migrated from the bottom 
decile of the income distribution in 2007 to a higher decile income group in 2009. It can also be 
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seen from Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 that based on the 2007 income ranking, 22.2% of all female-
headed households were located in the bottom decile, whereas based on the 2009 income ranking, 
only 20.27% of female-headed households were located in the bottom decile in that year. The 
location of the female group’s distribution shifted relative to the male group’s distribution. Income 
inequality among the female-headed households decreased after the crisis.  
 [Insert Table 4-24 here] 
 Table 4-24 shows the chi-square test statistics for the difference in the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates between the male- and female-headed households. The difference was significant for 
both 2007 and 2009; however, the test statistics indicated that the male- and female-headed 
households became more alike after the crisis, as the chi-square statistics dropped from 92,704 in 
2007 to 17,414 in 2009. The chi-square statistics were also significant for the tests that compared 
the decomposed Lorenz and concentration curve ordinates within each gender group before and 
after the crisis. The results are similar to the ones obtained in the previous section, where the 
subgroups were created based on racial characteristics.  
4.5.4 Decomposition by retirement status  
[Insert Table 4-13 here] 
 In this section, I present the decomposition results based on the retirement status of the 
household head. Retirement can significantly change households’ income level and composition, 
and it is useful to examine whether the financial crisis had different effects on households with 
different retirement statuses. Table 4-15 presents the decomposed 2007 Lorenz ordinates by 
retirement status. In 2007, retired households in the bottom 50% of the income distribution 
received 23.3% of their group’s income, while non-retired households in the bottom 50% of the 
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2007 income distribution received 13.2% of their group’s income. The retired households had a 
more equal income distribution. This is consistent with the finding from Panel C of Table 4-4, 
which shows that 67.5% of the retired households were in the bottom 50% of the income 
distribution, while only 46.1% of the non-retired households were in the bottom 50% of the income 
distribution, and this can partly explain why the retired households in the bottom 50% of the 
income distribution received a higher share of their group’s income compared to the non-retired 
households.   
 It is interesting to note that the decomposed ordinates are very similar in the top decile of 
the income distribution for both groups. However, combining information from Table 4-4 and 
Table 4-13, we can see that 6.3% of retired households were in the top 10% income distribution 
and they received 47% of their group’s income, whereas 10.7% of the non-retired households were 
in the top 10% income distribution, and they also received about 47% of their group’s income in 
2007. Both groups had the same decomposed Lorenz ordinates for the top decile, but the retired 
group had a smaller percentage of households in the top decile, which implies that the income was 
more skewed to the right within the retirement group.  
 Panel B of Table 4-13 presents the additive decomposition results by subgroup. The 
contribution of the retired group to the overall sample ordinates in the bottom decile was 30.9%, 
and the non-retired group contributed 69.1%.  The retired group’s contribution share decreased for 
each subsequent decile. In the 9th decile, the retired group contributed only 14.8% to the overall 
Lorenz ordinates, while the non-retired group contributed the remaining 85.2%.  
[Insert Table 4-14 and Table 4-15 here] 
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Table 4-14 and Table 4-15 present the results for the decomposed Lorenz curve and the 
concentration curve in 2009.  For both the retired group and the non-retired group, the decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates and the concentration ordinates increased in all 9 deciles. However, the 
decomposed concentration ordinates increased even more. In 2007, the retired households in the 
bottom decile of the income distribution received 1.83% of their group’s income, whereas this 
same group of households received 3.65% of the total retirement income in 2009. But if we focus 
only on the change in the decomposed Lorenz ordinates, the change was smaller, i.e.,  from 0.0183 
in 2007 to 0.0240 in 2009, which can be interpreted as a result of the fact that the retired households 
in the bottom decile of the 2009 income distribution received 2.4% of their group’s income in 2009. 
Despite the difference in magnitude, both the decomposed 2009 Lorenz curve and concentration 
curve indicate that income inequality decreased for both subgroups after the crisis.  
4.6 Discussion  
4.6.1 Crisis effects in the longer run.  
 Though the SCF provides more complete information with which to study the income 
distribution of American households, especially for households in the top decile, where incomes 
were most affected by the negative impact of the financial crisis, the panel dataset has its 
drawbacks. It has observations for only two waves, which makes it impossible to study the longer 
term effect of financial crisis using the decomposition method. In this section, I supplement the 
analysis by using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a panel dataset of a 
nationally representative sample of 5,000 households since 1968. The PSID has collected social, 
economic, and income data from the originally interviewed families, as well as from families 
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started by the descendants of the original families, for over four decades. This longitudinal dataset 
allows researchers to track households’ income change over a longer period of time. Nevertheless, 
one drawback of the PSID is that the households surveyed were a representative national sample 
in 1968 but might fail to consist of the most updated representative sample for the recent decade. 
And unlike the SCF, which provides more accurate measurement for high-income earners, the 
PSID does not cover enough wealthy households, and this makes it less than ideal for studying 
change in the top decile of the income distribution. Despite the limitations of the PSID, some useful 
inferences can still be made for studying the longer term effects of the financial crisis.  
[Insert Table 4-16 to Table 4-19 here] 
 To study the longer term effects of the 2008 financial crisis, I use the PSID 2006 and 2012 
waves, the latter being the most recent available one. In this analysis, I focus on decomposing the 
overall Lorenz curve and the concentration curve into the white and the non-white groups.9 In 
2012, four years after the financial crisis, while the U.S. stock market rebounded to its previous 
level and continued to rise, the decomposed ordinates of the Lorenz curve for the white group 
reverted back to their pre-crisis level.  However, the decomposed ordinates for the non-white group 
were still higher in 2012. In addition, for both groups, the decomposed concentration ordinates 
remained higher than the pre-crisis level.  For example, measured by the PSID data, non-white 
households in the bottom 9 deciles of the income distribution received 78.7% of their groups’ 
income in 2006. And these same sets of households received 85% of their group’s income in 2012. 
Similar results hold for the white group. In 2006, white households in the bottom 9 deciles of the 
                                                 
9 Decomposition based on other characteristics such as gender and retirement status can be done similarly; the results 
are not shown here. 
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income distribution received 63.7% of their group’s income, and the same households received 
68.7% of their group’s income in 2012, a five percent increase from their 2006 level. These results 
imply that the longer term effects of the financial crisis do exist as measured by the concentration 
ordinates.  
4.6.2 Comparison with the 1987 stock market crash  
 In addition to the usefulness of the PSID for studying the longer term effects of the 2008 
financial crisis, the span of the PSID also provides us with a means to study the change in the 
income distribution in relation to previous stock market crashes, and to see if they had impacts on 
the income distribution similar to those found for the 2008 financial crisis. Historically, another 
dramatic decline in the stock market happened in October, 1987. To compare the impacts of these 
two financial crises, I conducted a similar decomposition analysis to examine the impact of the 
1987 stock market crash on U.S. households’ income distribution. For this analysis, I used two 
years of PSID data: those from the 1986 and 1988 waves.   
[Insert Table 4-20 to Table 4-22 here] 
 Table 4-20 to Table 4-22 present the decomposition results. I find that the 1987 stock 
market crash had a similar immediate effect on income distribution, measured by the 1988 
concentration ordinates. Both the white and the non-white groups’ conditional income share in the 
bottom 9 deciles increased after the crisis. The results also hold for the decomposed 1988 Lorenz 
ordinates from the bottom to the 7th deciles for the white group, but the magnitude was smaller. 
Despite the lower stock market participation rate of the average household 20 years ago, the 1987 
stock market crash still led to a change in the income distribution in the short run, especially for 
the non-white group, but the magnitude appears to be smaller. 
  
138 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 Income inequality has risen substantially in the last 40 years in the U.S., and many studies 
have attempted to explain the cause of this trend. In addition to other events, economy-wide shocks 
can have a large impact on the distribution of income. The 2008 Financial Crisis, the largest 
economic recession since World War II, reduced many households’ income level, and the 
reduction was not uniform for all households, which led to a change in the income distribution 
among U.S. households. This paper documents income distribution changes before and after the 
Financial Crisis. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance 2007-2009 panel dataset, I apply a non-
parametric decomposition method to quantify the change in the income distribution, measured by 
the Lorenz curve and its associated concentration curve. Instead of focusing on a single inequality 
index, this approach analyzes the whole income distribution, and can thus better track income share 
changes of the households in each decile. Moreover, the decomposition approach allows me to 
examine how different subgroups, defined based on households’ demographic characteristics, 
contribute to the overall income inequality.  
 The findings show that income inequality dropped immediately after the financial crisis, 
and most of the drop came from the decrease in the income share of the top income earners, defined 
as the households in the top 10% of the income distribution. The drop was more substantial in the 
associated concentration ordinates, a conditional measure of the Lorenz ordinates. Subgroup 
decomposition shows that non-white, female-headed, or retired households contributed relatively 
more to the lower deciles of the overall Lorenz and concentration ordinates, while white, male-
headed, or non-retired households contributed more to the higher deciles of the overall Lorenz and 
the concentration ordinates. All decomposed concentration ordinates increased for each subgroup 
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in 2009, and the bottom nine deciles’ ordinates remained larger 4 years after the financial crisis, 
while the decomposed Lorenz ordinates reverted back to their pre-crisis level during this longer 
time span. In addition, compared to the impact of the 1987 stock market crash on income 
distribution, the short run effect of the 2008 financial crisis was larger, measured by both the 
Lorenz ordinates and the concentration ordinates.  
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Table 4-1: Summary statistics for key variables in the SCF 2007 & 2009 
This table provides summary statistics for the key variables of the SCF 2007-2009 panel data; all data are weighted 
using the weight provided by the SCF.  
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation N 
     
Age 49.4 48.0 16.8 3857 
 
Education 13.4 13.0 2.8 3857 
 
Income     
  2007 89,036 49,841  3857 
  2009 80,816 49,810  3857 
Assets     
 2007 698,251 226,796 3,501,309 3857 
 2009 583,014 197,900 2,858,847 3857 
Debts     
 2007 102,509 33,346 193,751 3857 
 2009 103,939 33,000 206,227 3857 
Leverage Ratio     
 2007 22 0.227 419 3847 
 2009 26 0.257 528 3847 
Net Worth     
 2007 595,742 128,000 3,446,799 3857 
 2009 479,074  96,900 2,801,402 3857 
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Table 4-2: Summary statistics for the income variable by group 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the income variable based on race, gender, and retirement status.  
 
Sample Number of 
Observations 
Weighed 
Percentage 
Of Observations 
Percentage of Earnings 
Contributed 
Median Equivalent Earnings 
   2007            2009 2007            2009 
 
Panel A:  By Race  
White 2,915 68.2% 79.2% 77.4% 103,552 91,750 
Non-White 942 31.8% 20.8% 22.6% 58,211 57,490 
 
 
Panel B: By Gender  
Male 3084 72.6% 88.7% 86.7% 108,795 96,617 
Female  773 27.4% 11.3% 13.3% 36,905 38,987 
 
Panel C: By Retirement Status  
Retired 677 18.8% 15% 14.3% 71,550 61,770 
Non-Retired 3180 81.2% 85% 85.7% 93,183 85,253 
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Table 4-3: Decile composition by subgroups (2007) 
 
This table presents the decile composition by race, gender, and retirement status.  
Decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
Panel A: By Race           
White Count 1219273 1278994 1446992 1461333 1541349 1733279 1381665 1714052 1753806 1904269 
% 53% 57% 64% 66% 66% 72% 66% 75% 77% 85% 
            
Non-
White 
Count 1061083 965562.5 813174.6 758644 792150.6 683053.9 704699.8 564386.5 517524.1 340882.7 
% 47% 43% 36% 34% 34% 28% 34% 25% 23% 15% 
          
Panel B: By Gender           
Male Count 905990 1027826 1254534 1536606 1754497 1881030 1784549 2062950 2074390 2161062 
% 40% 46% 56% 69% 75% 78% 86% 91% 91% 96% 
            
Female Count 1374366 1216730 1005633 683371 579002 535303 301816 215488 196940 84090 
% 60% 54% 44% 31% 25% 22% 14% 9% 9% 4% 
         
Panel C: By Retirement Status          
Retired Count 581360 729254 624325 487138 443648 357490 294779 227597 229637 268365 
% 25% 32% 28% 22% 19% 15% 14% 10% 10% 12% 
            
Non-
Retired 
Count 1698996 1515302 1635842 1732839 1889851 2058843 1791585 2050842 2041693 1976786 
% 75% 68% 72% 78% 81% 85% 86% 90% 90% 88% 
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Table 4-4: Group composition by 2007 decile 
 
This table presents the population distribution in each decile by groups. The decile cut-off points are calculated using the 2007 income data. 
Decile   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Panel A: By Race           
White Count  1219273 1278994 1446992 1461333 1541349 1733279 1381665 1714052 1753806 1904269 
% 7.9% 8.3% 9.4% 9.5% 10.0% 11.2% 9.0% 11.1% 11.4% 12.3% 
 Cumulative % 7.9% 16.2% 25.6% 35.0% 45.0% 56.2% 65.2% 76.3% 87.7% 100.0% 
            
Non-
White 
Count 1061083 965562 813174 758644 792150 683053 704699 564386 517524 340882 
% 14.7% 13.4% 11.3% 10.5% 11.0% 9.5% 9.8% 7.8% 7.2% 4.7% 
 Cumulative % 14.7% 28.1% 39.4% 50.0% 61.0% 70.5% 80.2% 88.1% 95.3% 100.0% 
            
Panel B: By Gender           
Male Count 905990 1027826 1254534 1536606 1754497 1881030 1784549 2062950 2074390 2161062 
% 5.5% 6.3% 7.6% 9.3% 10.7% 11.4% 10.9% 12.5% 12.6% 13.1% 
 Cumulative % 5.5% 11.8% 19.4% 28.7% 39.4% 50.8% 61.7% 74.2% 86.9% 100.0% 
            
Female Count 1374366 1216730 1005633 683371 579002 535303 301816 215488 196940 84090 
% 22.2% 19.6% 16.2% 11.0% 9.3% 8.6% 4.9% 3.5% 3.2% 1.4% 
 Cumulative % 22.2% 41.8% 58.1% 69.1% 78.5% 87.1% 92.0% 95.5% 98.6% 100.0% 
            
Panel C: By Retirement Status          
Retired Count 581360 729254 624325 487138 443648 357490 294779 227597 229637 268365 
% 13.7% 17.2% 14.7% 11.5% 10.5% 8.4% 6.9% 5.4% 5.4% 6.3% 
 Cumulative % 13.7% 30.9% 45.6% 57.1% 67.5% 76.0% 82.9% 88.3% 93.7% 100.0% 
            
Non-
Retired 
Count 1698996 1515302 1635842 1732839 1889851 2058843 1791585 2050842 2041693 1976786 
% 9.2% 8.2% 8.9% 9.4% 10.3% 11.2% 9.7% 11.2% 11.1% 10.7% 
 Cumulative % 9.2% 17.5% 26.4% 35.8% 46.1% 57.3% 67.0% 78.2% 89.3% 100.0% 
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Table 4-5: Group composition by 2009 decile 
 
This table presents the population distribution in each decile by groups. The decile cut-off points are calculated using the 2009 income data. 
Decile   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Panel A: By Race           
White Count 1249094 1301192 1349647 1468930 1526066 1552331 1669147 1748652 1782662 1828168 
% 8.07% 8.41% 8.72% 9.49% 9.86% 10.03% 10.79% 11.30% 11.52% 11.81% 
 Cumulative % 8.07% 16.48% 25.20% 34.69% 44.55% 54.58% 65.37% 76.67% 88.19% 100.00% 
            
Non-
White 
Count 1034499 983916 767146 884123 706670 631180 675068 555812 480704 441168 
% 14.45% 13.74% 10.71% 12.35% 9.87% 8.82% 9.43% 7.76% 6.71% 6.16% 
 Cumulative % 14.45% 28.19% 38.90% 51.25% 61.12% 69.93% 79.36% 87.13% 93.84% 100.00% 
            
 
Panel B: By Gender           
Male Count 1028128 1090440 1330348 1637062 1532749 1720845 1841906 2074227 2008307 2179423 
% 6.25% 6.63% 8.09% 9.96% 9.32% 10.47% 11.20% 12.61% 12.21% 13.25% 
 Cumulative % 6.25% 12.88% 20.97% 30.93% 40.25% 50.72% 61.92% 74.53% 86.75% 100.00% 
            
Female Count 1255465 1194668 786445 715992 699986 462665 502308 230236 255058 89914 
% 20.27% 19.29% 12.70% 11.56% 11.30% 7.47% 8.11% 3.72% 4.12% 1.45% 
 Cumulative % 20.27% 39.56% 52.26% 63.83% 75.13% 82.60% 90.71% 94.43% 98.55% 100.00% 
            
Panel C: By Retirement Status          
Retired Count 691663 670328.8 553461.4 657576 362662.8 360751.1 337121.8 251245 153635.5 205149.3 
% 16.30% 15.80% 13.04% 15.50% 8.55% 8.50% 7.94% 5.92% 3.62% 4.83% 
 Cumulative % 16.30% 32.10% 45.14% 60.63% 69.18% 77.68% 85.62% 91.55% 95.17% 100.00% 
            
Non-
Retired 
Count 1591930 1614779 1563332 1695478 1870073 1822760 2007093 2053218 2109730 2064187 
% 8.66% 8.78% 8.50% 9.22% 10.17% 9.91% 10.91% 11.16% 11.47% 11.22% 
 Cumulative % 8.66% 17.43% 25.93% 35.15% 45.32% 55.23% 66.14% 77.31% 88.78% 100.00% 
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Table 4-6: Lorenz ordinates decomposition for the overall sample (2007 vs. 2009) 
 
This table presents the order statistics (upper cutoff values) and the Lorenz ordinates for 2007 and 2009 data from the SCF. The standard error for the Lorenz ordinates 
are in parentheses.  
 
 
Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates 2007  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall 
Sample 
0.0098 
(0.0016) 
0.0301 
(0.0044) 
0.0600 
(0.0085) 
0.0992 
(0.0138) 
0.1473 
(0.0203) 
0.2095 
(0.0286) 
0.2884 
(0.0391) 
0.3862 
(0.0520) 
0.5218 
(0.0697) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B : Lorenz Ordinates 2009 
Order Statistic 13,947 22,116 29,886 38,851 49,810 61,760 79,696 102,011 147,039 - 
Overall 
Sample 
0.0111 
(0.0013) 
0.0335 
(0.0034) 
0.0641 
(0.0060) 
0.1076 
(0.0096) 
0.1608 
(0.0140) 
0.2299 
(0.0195) 
0.3158 
(0.0263) 
0.4285 
(0.0349) 
0.5778 
(0.0458) 
1.0000 
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Table 4-7: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2007)  
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2007 data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz ordinates 
are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race.  
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates 
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 0.0098 
(0.0016) 
0.0301 
(0.0044) 
0.0600 
(0.0085) 
0.0992 
(0.0138) 
0.1473 
(0.0203) 
0.2095 
(0.0286) 
0.2884 
(0.0391) 
0.3862 
(0.0520) 
0.5218 
(0.0697) 
1.0000 
White 0.0067 
(0.0013) 
0.0213 
(0.0039) 
0.0453 
(0.0080) 
0.0776 
(0.0134) 
0.1175 
(0.0201) 
0.1732 
(0.0293) 
0.2404 
(0.0403) 
0.3321 
(0.0533) 
0.4646 
(0.0768) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0222 
(0.0040) 
0.0643 
(0.0101) 
0.1167 
(0.0174) 
0.1827 
(0.0261) 
0.2621 
(0.0364) 
0.3495 
(0.0474) 
0.4738 
(0.0625) 
0.5951 
(0.0766) 
0.7422 
(0.0926) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution 
White 53.4% 56.1% 59.9% 62.1% 63.4% 65.7% 66.2% 68.3% 70.7% 79.2% 
Non-White 46.6% 43.9% 40.1% 37.9% 36.6% 34.3% 33.8% 31.7% 29.3% 20.8% 
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Table 4-8: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2009 data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz ordinates 
are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race.  
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,947 22,116 29,886 38,851 49,810 61,760 79,696 102,011 147,039 - 
Overall Sample 0.0111 
(0.0013) 
0.0335 
(0.0034) 
0.0641 
(0.0060) 
0.1076 
(0.0096) 
0.1608 
(0.0140) 
0.2299 
(0.0195) 
0.3158 
(0.0263) 
0.4285 
(0.0349) 
0.5778 
(0.0458) 
1.0000 
White 0.0077 
(0.0012) 
0.0241 
(0.0031) 
0.0492 
(0.0059) 
0.0842 
(0.0096) 
0.1311 
(0.0144) 
0.1946 
(0.0209) 
0.2731 
(0.0287) 
0.3845 
(0.0395) 
0.5358 
(0.0528) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0230 
(0.0035) 
0.0659 
(0.0079) 
0.1152 
(0.0125) 
0.1881 
(0.0188) 
0.2629 
(0.0249) 
0.3512 
(0.0316) 
0.4624 
(0.0394) 
0.5799 
(0.0465) 
0.7221 
(0.0534) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Group 1 53.4% 55.7% 59.5% 60.6% 63.2% 65.6% 67.0% 69.5% 71.8% 77.4% 
Group 2  46.6% 44.3% 40.5% 39.4% 36.8% 34.4% 33.0% 30.5% 28.2% 22.6% 
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Table 4-9: Concentration ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the concentration ordinates for the 2009 data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed 
Concentration ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Concentration Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 
0.0225 
(0.0049) 
0.0518 
(0.0066) 
0.0935 
(0.0097) 
0.1411 
(0.0132) 
0.2004 
(0.0179) 
0.2724 
(0.0233) 
0.3596 
(0.0299) 
0.4674 
(0.0378) 
0.6221 
(0.0478) 
1.0000 
White 0.0176 
(0.0059) 
0.0387 
(0.0072) 
0.0722 
(0.0101) 
0.1134 
(0.0138) 
0.1668 
(0.0191) 
0.2326 
(0.0254) 
0.3106 
(0.0328) 
0.4158 
(0.0427) 
0.5743 
(0.0562) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0396 
(0.0068) 
0.0969 
(0.0124) 
0.1665 
(0.0189) 
0.2365 
(0.0241) 
0.3160 
(0.0298) 
0.4091 
(0.0361) 
0.5282 
(0.0434) 
0.6446 
(0.0495) 
0.7867 
(0.0549) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
White 60.4% 57.8% 59.9% 62.2% 64.5% 66.2% 66.9% 68.9% 71.5% 77.4% 
Non-White  39.6% 42.2% 40.1% 37.8% 35.5% 33.8% 33.1% 31.1% 28.5% 22.6% 
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Table 4-10: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by gender (2007) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2007 data by gender. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by gender. 
 
 
Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 
0.0098 
(0.0016) 
0.0301 
(0.0044) 
0.0600 
(0.0085) 
0.0992 
(0.0138) 
0.1473 
(0.0203) 
0.2095 
(0.0286) 
0.2884 
(0.0391) 
0.3862 
(0.0520) 
0.5218 
(0.0697) 
1.0000 
Male 
0.0042 
(0.0009) 
0.0149 
(0.0026) 
0.0336 
(0.0056) 
0.0646 
(0.0104) 
0.1051 
(0.0165) 
0.1594 
(0.0247) 
0.2354 
(0.0360) 
0.3349 
(0.0508) 
0.4745 
(0.0713) 
1.0000 
Female 
0.0541 
(0.0084) 
0.1505 
(0.0199) 
0.2687 
(0.0330) 
0.3730 
(0.0439) 
0.4809 
(0.0547) 
0.6060 
(0.0663) 
0.7083 
(0.0751) 
0.7925 
(0.0815) 
0.8955 
(0.0879) 
 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Male  0.3819 0.4402 0.4974 0.5783 0.6338 0.6756 0.7246 0.7699 0.8075 88.7% 
Female  0.6181 0.5598 0.5026 0.4217 0.3662 0.3244 0.2754 0.2301 0.1925 11.3% 
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Table 4-11: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by gender (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2009 data by gender. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by gender.  
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,947 22,116 29,886 38,851 49,810 61,760 79,696 102,011 147,039 - 
Overall Sample 0.0111 
(0.0013) 
0.0335 
(0.0034) 
0.0641 
(0.0060) 
0.1076 
(0.0096) 
0.1608 
(0.0140) 
0.2299 
(0.0195) 
0.3158 
(0.0263) 
0.4285 
(0.0349) 
0.5778 
(0.0458) 
1.0000 
Male 0.0055 
(0.0009) 
0.0180 
(0.0023) 
0.0401 
(0.0046) 
0.0751 
(0.0080) 
0.1171 
(0.0120) 
0.1797 
(0.0178) 
0.2576 
(0.0249) 
0.3743 
(0.0352) 
0.5268 
(0.0482) 
1.0000 
Female 0.0481 
(0.0063) 
0.1358 
(0.0137) 
0.2231 
(0.0200) 
0.3224 
(0.0263) 
0.4499 
(0.0332) 
0.5618 
(0.0380) 
0.7002 
(0.0417) 
0.7866 
(0.0424) 
0.9150 
(0.0385) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Male  0.4313 0.4674 0.5429 0.6063 0.6325 0.6790 0.7087 0.7588 0.7919 86.7% 
Female  0.5687 0.5326 0.4571 0.3937 0.3675 0.3210 0.2913 0.2412 0.2081 13.3% 
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Table 4-12:Concentration ordinates and subsample decomposition by gender (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the concentration ordinates for the 2009 data by gender. The standard errors for the decomposed 
concentration ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by gender.  
 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Concentration Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 0.0225 
(0.0049) 
0.0518 
(0.0066) 
0.0935 
(0.0097) 
0.1411 
(0.0132) 
0.2004 
(0.0179) 
0.2724 
(0.0233) 
0.3596 
(0.0299) 
0.4674 
(0.0378) 
0.6221 
(0.0478) 
1.0000 
Male 0.0132 
(0.0051) 
0.0283 
(0.0060) 
0.0555 
(0.0080) 
0.0943 
(0.0112) 
0.1468 
(0.0159) 
0.2090 
(0.0212) 
0.2949 
(0.0287) 
0.4076 
(0.0383) 
0.5741 
(0.0512) 
1.0000 
Female 0.0842 
(0.0121) 
0.2067 
(0.0210) 
0.3446 
(0.0290) 
0.4507 
(0.0336) 
0.5549 
(0.0373) 
0.6913 
(0.0398) 
0.7879 
(0.0400) 
0.8627 
(0.0386) 
0.9400 
(0.0350) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Male  0.5089 0.4755 0.5156 0.5805 0.6363 0.6666 0.7122 0.7575 0.8015 86.7% 
Female  0.4911 0.5245 0.4844 0.4195 0.3637 0.3334 0.2878 0.2425 0.1985 13.3% 
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Table 4-13: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by retirement status (2007) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2007 data by retirement status. The standard errors for the decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by retirement status. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 0.0098 
(0.0016) 
0.0301 
(0.0044) 
0.0600 
(0.0085) 
0.0992 
(0.0138) 
0.1473 
(0.0203) 
0.2095 
(0.0286) 
0.2884 
(0.0391) 
0.3862 
(0.0520) 
0.5218 
(0.0697) 
1.0000 
Retired  0.0183 
(0.0067) 
0.0621 
(0.0214) 
0.1160 
(0.0392) 
0.1740 
(0.0583) 
0.2334 
(0.0583) 
0.2945 
(0.0777) 
0.3677 
(0.0977) 
0.4348 
(0.1214) 
0.5218 
(0.1430) 
1.0000 
Non-Retired  0.0083 
(0.0015) 
0.0245 
(0.0040) 
0.0500 
(0.0079) 
0.0860 
(0.0132) 
0.1320 
(0.0200) 
0.1944 
(0.0292) 
0.2744 
(0.0408) 
0.3776 
(0.0557) 
0.5217 
(0.0762) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Retired  0.2807 0.3097 0.2910 0.2638 0.2384 0.2115 0.1918 0.1694 0.1504 15.0.% 
Non-Retired  0.7193 0.6903 0.7090 0.7362 0.7616 0.7885 0.8082 0.8306 0.8496 85.0% 
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Table 4-14: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by retirement status (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2009 data by retirement status. The standard errors for the decomposed 
Lorenz ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by retirement status. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,947 22,116 29,886 38,851 49,810 61,760 79,696 102,011 147,039 - 
Overall Sample 0.0111 
(0.0013) 
0.0335 
(0.0034) 
0.0641 
(0.0060) 
0.1076 
(0.0096) 
0.1608 
(0.0140) 
0.2299 
(0.0195) 
0.3158 
(0.0263) 
0.4285 
(0.0349) 
0.5778 
(0.0458) 
1.0000 
Retired 0.0240 
(0.0068) 
0.0703 
(0.0182) 
0.1278 
(0.0322) 
0.2120 
(0.0522) 
0.2723 
(0.0664) 
0.3523 
(0.0851) 
0.4381 
(0.1049) 
0.5255 
(0.1248) 
0.5971 
(0.1407) 
1.0000 
Non-Retired 0.0090 
(0.0012) 
0.0273 
(0.0030) 
0.0535 
(0.0055) 
0.0901 
(0.0088) 
0.1422 
(0.0133) 
0.2094 
(0.0191) 
0.2953 
(0.0262) 
0.4123 
(0.0356) 
0.5745 
(0.0482) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Retired 0.3096 0.3006 0.2853 0.2821 0.2424 0.2194 0.1986 0.1756 0.1479 14.3% 
Non-Retired 0.6904 0.6994 0.7147 0.7179 0.7576 0.7806 0.8014 0.8244 0.8521 85.7% 
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Table 4-15: Concentration ordinates and subsample decomposition by retirement status (2009) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the concentration ordinates for the 2009 data by retirement status. The standard errors for the 
decomposed concentration ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by retirement status. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Concentration Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13,632 22,577 31,736 39,191 49,841 63,899 77,956 102,238 149,097 - 
Overall Sample 0.0225 
(0.0049) 
0.0518 
(0.0066) 
0.0935 
(0.0097) 
0.1411 
(0.0132) 
0.2004 
(0.0179) 
0.2724 
(0.0233) 
0.3596 
(0.0299) 
0.4674 
(0.0378) 
0.6221 
(0.0478) 
1.0000 
Retired  0.0365 
(0.0270) 
0.0935 
(0.0336) 
0.1588 
(0.0452) 
0.2310 
(0.0602) 
0.3076 
(0.0772) 
0.3764 
(0.0921) 
0.4542 
(0.1090) 
0.5168 
(0.1227) 
0.6582 
(0.1305) 
1.0000 
Non-Retired  0.0202 
(0.0035) 
0.0448 
(0.0056) 
0.0825 
(0.0090) 
0.1261 
(0.0126) 
0.1825 
(0.0173) 
0.2550 
(0.0232) 
0.3438 
(0.0304) 
0.4591 
(0.0394) 
0.6161 
(0.0511)  
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Retired  0.2319 0.2586 0.2432 0.2342 0.2197 0.1978 0.1808 0.1583 0.1514 14.3% 
Non-Retired  0.7681 0.7414 0.7568 0.7658 0.7803 0.8022 0.8192 0.8417 0.8486 85.7% 
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Table 4-16: Lorenz ordinates decomposition for the overall sample (2006 vs. 2012) 
This table presents the order statistics (upper cutoff values) and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2006 and 2012 PSID data. The standard errors for the Lorenz ordinates are 
in parentheses.  
 
 Bottom 
Decile 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total 
Sample 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates 2006  
Order Statistic 14553 24387 34234 45801 57576 72294 89427 114259 159054 
- 
Overall Sample 0.0099 0.0340 0.0705 0.1205 0.1851 0.2656 0.3655 0.4906 0.6577 1.0000 
Panel B : Lorenz Ordinates 2012 
Order Statistic 13633 23129 32849 43423 56958 70403 87696 111595 154945 
- 
Overall Sample 0.0097 
 
0.0329 
 
0.0689 
 
0.1179 
 
0.1820 
 
0.2627 
 
0.3631 
 
0.4896 
 
0.6559 
 
1.0000 
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Table 4-17: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2006) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2006 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom Decile 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates 
Order Statistic 14553 24387 34234 45801 57576 72294 89427 114259 159054 - 
Overall Sample 0.0099 
(0.0012) 
0.0340 
(0.0029) 
0.0705 
(0.0051) 
0.1205 
(0.0078) 
0.1851 
(0.0110) 
0.2656 
(0.0146) 
0.3655 
(0.0186) 
0.4906 
(0.0228) 
0.6577 
(0.0270) 
1.0000 
White 0.0072 
(0.0011) 
0.0283 
(0.0028) 
0.0597 
(0.0050) 
0.1030 
(0.0077) 
0.1651 
(0.0112) 
0.2402 
(0.0150) 
0.3373 
(0.0194) 
0.4651 
(0.0244) 
0.6369 
(0.0294) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0268 
(0.0053) 
0.0695 
(0.0112) 
0.1378 
(0.0192) 
0.2298 
(0.0286) 
0.3098 
(0.0359) 
0.4246 
(0.0449) 
0.5416 
(0.0523) 
0.6498 
(0.0573) 
0.7874 
(0.0594) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution 
White 62.7% 71.8% 73.1% 73.7% 76.9% 78.0% 79.6% 81.7% 83.5% 86.2% 
Non-White 37.3% 28.2% 26.9% 26.3% 23.1% 22.0% 20.4% 18.3% 16.5% 13.8% 
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Table 4-18: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2012) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 2012 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 13633 23129 32849 43423 56958 70403 87696 111595 154945 - 
Overall Sample 0.0097 
(0.0012) 
0.0329 
(0.0030) 
0.0689 
(0.0054) 
0.1179 
(0.0083) 
0.1820 
(0.0119) 
0.2627 
(0.0161) 
0.3631 
(0.0209) 
0.4896 
(0.0263) 
0.6559 
(0.0322) 
1.0000 
White 0.0072 
(0.0012) 
0.0258 
(0.0028) 
0.0561 
(0.0051) 
0.1000 
(0.0082) 
0.1609 
(0.0082) 
0.2368 
(0.0082) 
0.3365 
(0.0121) 
0.4649 
(0.0166) 
0.6307 
(0.0220) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0263 
(0.0051) 
0.0792 
(0.0121) 
0.1532 
(0.0121) 
0.2361 
(0.0203) 
0.3205 
(0.0284) 
0.4332 
(0.0358) 
0.5381 
(0.0440) 
0.6519 
(0.0500) 
0.8219 
(0.0543) 
1.0000 
 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
Group 1 64.3% 68.2% 70.7% 73.6% 76.8% 78.2% 80.4% 82.4% 83.5% 86.8% 
Group 2  35.7% 31.8% 29.3% 26.4% 23.2% 21.8% 19.6% 17.6% 16.5% 13.2% 
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Table 4-19: Concentration ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (2012) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the concentration ordinates for the 2012 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed 
concentration ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Concentration Ordinates  
Order Statistic 14553 24387 34234 45801 57576 72294 89427 114259 159054 - 
Overall Sample 
0.0309 
(0.0056) 
0.0685 
(0.0080) 
0.1122 
(0.0099) 
0.1679 
(0.0126) 
0.2386 
(0.0126) 
0.3231 
(0.0160) 
0.4271 
(0.0197) 
0.5517 
(0.0240) 
0.7084 
(0.0285) 
1.0000 
White 0.0259 
(0.0060) 
0.0610 
(0.0085) 
0.0996 
(0.0104) 
0.1484 
(0.0130) 
0.2176 
(0.0168) 
0.2965 
(0.0207) 
0.3988 
(0.0256) 
0.5250 
(0.0309) 
0.6868 
(0.0365) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0640 
(0.0143)) 
0.1178 
(0.0217) 
0.1951 
(0.0284) 
0.2963 
(0.0361) 
0.3765 
(0.0414) 
0.4977 
(0.0479) 
0.6131 
(0.0520) 
0.7276 
(0.0531) 
0.8502 
(0.0502) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
White 72.7% 77.3% 77.1% 76.7% 79.2% 79.7% 81.1% 82.6% 84.2% 86.8% 
Non-White  27.3% 22.7% 22.9% 23.3% 20.8% 20.3% 18.9% 17.4% 15.8% 13.2% 
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Table 4-20: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (1986) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 1986 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates 
Order Statistic 12975 23489 32580 43215 52616 64992 78647 96000 126048 - 
Overall Sample 0.0035 
(0.0006) 
0.0248 
(0.0025) 
0.0641 
(0.0051) 
0.1195 
(0.0082) 
0.1928 
(0.0118) 
0.2827 
(0.0155) 
0.3940 
(0.0194) 
0.5275 
(0.0230) 
0.7005 
(0.0259) 
1.0000 
White 0.0017 
(0.0005) 
0.0170 
(0.0021) 
0.0478 
(0.0046) 
0.0953 
(0.0077) 
0.1652 
(0.0116) 
0.2529 
(0.0157) 
0.3628 
(0.0201) 
0.4990 
(0.0244) 
0.6783 
(0.0280) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0175 
(0.0043) 
0.0871 
(0.0141) 
0.1939 
(0.0261) 
0.3126 
(0.0367) 
0.4121 
(0.0440) 
0.5196 
(0.0499) 
0.6424 
(0.0537) 
0.7540 
(0.0534) 
0.8772 
(0.0464) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution 
White 44.0% 60.8% 66.2% 70.8% 76.1% 79.5% 81.8% 84.0% 86.0% 88.3% 
Non-White 56.0% 39.2% 33.8% 29.2% 23.9% 20.5% 18.2% 16.0% 14.0% 11.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
160 
 
Table 4-21: Lorenz ordinates and subsample decomposition by race   (1988) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the Lorenz ordinates for the 1988 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed Lorenz 
ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Lorenz Ordinates  
Order Statistic 12573 21876 32347 42016 51966 64343 78358 96690 132546 1.0000 
Overall Sample 0.0116 
(0.0014) 
0.0382 
(0.0034) 
0.0806 
(0.0061) 
0.1376 
(0.0094) 
0.2097 
(0.0130) 
0.2987 
(0.0170) 
0.4055 
(0.0212) 
0.5308 
(0.0253) 
0.6961 
(0.0295) 
 
White 0.0071 
(0.0012) 
0.0264 
(0.0030) 
0.0583 
(0.0055) 
0.1085 
(0.0089) 
0.1736 
(0.0128) 
0.2561 
(0.0172) 
0.3631 
(0.0221) 
0.4906 
(0.0272) 
0.6624 
(0.0326) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.0385 
(0.0065) 
0.1092 
(0.0147) 
0.2144 
(0.0244) 
0.3127 
(0.0318) 
0.4262 
(0.0386) 
0.5545 
(0.0439) 
0.6604 
(0.0460) 
0.7727 
(0.0451) 
0.8985 
(0.0373) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
White 52.7% 59.2% 62.0% 67.6% 71.0% 73.5% 76.8% 79.2% 81.6% 85.7% 
Non-white  47.3% 40.8% 38.0% 32.4% 29.0% 26.5% 23.2% 20.8% 18.4% 14.3% 
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Table 4-22: Concentration ordinates and subsample decomposition by race (1988) 
 
Panel A of this table presents the decomposed order statistics and the concentration ordinates for the 1988 PSID data by race. The standard errors for the decomposed 
concentration ordinates are in parentheses. Panel B presents the additive decomposition in each decile by race. 
 
 Bottom 
Decile 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Concentration Ordinates  
Order Statistic 12573 21876 32347 42016 51966 64343 78358 96690 132546 1.0000 
Overall Sample 
0.0448 
(0.0062) 
0.0707 
(0.0072) 
0.1169 
(0.0095) 
0.1765 
(0.0123) 
0.2492 
(0.0154) 
0.3374 
(0.0189) 
0.4439 
(0.0227) 
0.5629 
(0.0262) 
0.7248 
(0.0295) 
1.0000 
White 0.0047 
(0.0015) 
0.0253 
(0.0037) 
0.0656 
(0.0072) 
0.1191 
(0.0106) 
0.1918 
(0.0146) 
0.2809 
(0.0189) 
0.3913 
(0.0236) 
0.5179 
(0.0282) 
0.6925 
(0.0329) 
1.0000 
Non-White 0.2863 
(0.0364) 
0.3433 
(0.0377) 
0.4249 
(0.0399) 
0.5217 
(0.0425) 
0.5943 
(0.0439) 
0.6770 
(0.0441) 
0.7598 
(0.0432) 
0.8336 
(0.0405) 
0.9189 
(0.0328) 
1.0000 
 
Panel B: Additive Decomposition by Subsample – Percentage Contribution  
White 8.9% 30.7% 48.1% 57.8% 66.0% 71.4% 75.6% 78.9% 81.9% 85.7% 
Non-White  91.1% 69.3% 51.9% 42.2% 34.0% 28.6% 24.4% 21.1% 18.1% 14.3% 
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Table 4-23: Chi-Squared test results by race (2007 vs. 2009) 
 
This table provides the chi-squared test results for the differences in the decomposition ordinates by race. 
 
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2007 Test Statistics: 
White vs. Non-White 32,602 
  
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2009 Test Statistics: 
White vs. Non-White 50,321 
  
  
Comparison of Concentration Ordinates within Subgroups (2007 vs.) 2009 Test Statistics: 
White  22,360 
Non-White 38,641 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-24: Chi-Squared test results by gender (2007 vs. 2009) 
 
This table provides the chi-squared test results for the differences in the decomposition ordinates by gender. 
 
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2007 Test Statistics: 
Male vs. Female 92,704 
  
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2009 Test Statistics: 
Male vs. Female 17,414 
  
Comparison of Concentration Ordinates within Subgroups (2007 vs.) 2009 Test Statistics: 
Male 24,579 
Female  48,990 
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Table 4-25: Chi-Squared test results by retirement status (2007 vs. 2009)  
 
This table provides the chi-squared test results for the differences in the decomposition ordinates by retirement status. 
 
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2007 Test Statistics: 
Retired vs. Non-Retired  33,536 
 
 
 
Comparison of Lorenz Ordinates across Subgroups in 2009 Test Statistics: 
Retired vs. Non-Retired 52,042 
 
 
 
Comparison of Concentration Ordinates within Subgroups (2007 vs.) 2009 Test Statistics: 
Retired 14,831 
Non-Retired  48,256 
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Figure 4-1 : Decomposed Lorenz ordinates by race (2007) 
This figure displays the overall and the decomposed Lorenz ordinates for the 2007 data by race. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Concentration Curve and its Decomposition (2009) by Race 
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Figure 4-2: Decomposition histogram (by race)  
This figure displays the contribution to each income decile by the white group and the non-white group for the 2007 
and 2009 data, respectively.  
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